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THE TWO STATES SOLUTION OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

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THE TWO STATES SOLUTION OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

Joe MAKHLOUF1, Raymond H.A. CARTER 2, Feras SALLOUM3, Tony WEHBEH4

1 Lebanese University, Center for Diplomatic and Strategic Studies – Paris, France

2 Center for Diplomatic and Strategic Studies – Paris, France

3 Belarus State University – Minsk, Belarus

4 Lebanese University – Department of Geography

Abstract

The negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis over the past five decades have revealed a lack of readiness on both sides to achieve peace. Each party anticipates future changes to impose its viewpoint and gain advantages. The Palestinian position is weakened by the division between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas, coupled with a lack of clear vision for the peace process. The PA’s acceptance of the Oslo Accords was based on hopes of establishing an independent state, but it failed due to Israeli intransigence, mismanagement, and corruption within the Palestinian administration, and the lack of a unifying national project. Hamas's control over Gaza, its wars with Israel, and its alliance with Iran have led to a decline in Arab support, reducing the Arab-Israeli conflict to a Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This shift was highlighted by normalization agreements between Israel and some Arab states. For Israel, the situation has evolved favorably due to unwavering support from the American administration, which gained traction under President Trump mandate and normalization with Arab countries. Israel's strategic military strength and the diminished threat from traditional state actors have lessened its incentive to negotiate with Palestinians. Israel focuses on countering the Iranian threat, viewing Iran's military and ideological ambitions as the primary danger. This has led to closer ties with Gulf states and efforts to prevent a new Iranian nuclear agreement. The geopolitical landscape in the Middle East poses significant challenges to resolving the Palestinian issue. The decline in American and Arab interest in the Palestinian cause, coupled with the potential consequences of Hamas's reliance on Iran, underscores the complexity and precariousness of the situation.

KEYWORDS: Two states solution, Israel, Palestine, Palestinian Authority, Hamas, conflict, Middle-East, Peace agreement.

1-Introduction

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a protracted and deeply entrenched struggle, has persisted for more than five decades, resisting numerous attempts at resolution. This enduring conflict is rooted in historical, political, and social complexities, with both sides holding steadfast to their narratives and aspirations. Over the years, various negotiations and peace processes have been initiated, yet a lasting and comprehensive peace remains out of reach (SMITH, 2016), (UN, 2024).

Central to this conflict is the dichotomy between the aspirations of the Palestinian people for statehood and self-determination, and the security concerns and territorial claims of the Israeli state. The Palestinians, divided between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, struggle with internal fragmentation and lack a unified vision for peace (WIDZER, 2024). The Palestinian Authority, which embraced the Oslo Accords with hopes of establishing a sovereign state, has been hampered by Israeli intransigence, internal mismanagement, and corruption. Furthermore, the schism between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, along with Hamas's alignment with Iran, has alienated crucial Arab support, reducing the Palestinian cause to a more isolated struggle (BROWN, 2015).

On the Israeli side, a robust military and strategic alliances, particularly with the United States and certain Arab states have fortified the position of the Hebrew state. The expansion of settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, coupled with the lack of a direct existential threat from neighboring Arab countries has lessened its incentive to compromise (MASALHA, 2023). The Israeli government, bolstered by support from the Trump administration, has secured significant geopolitical gains without making substantial concessions, such as moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem and achieving normalization agreements with some Gulf’s Arab countries.

The two-state solution, a cornerstone of international mediation efforts, faces severe challenges. The proliferation of Israeli settlements and the fragmented geography of the West Bank undermine the feasibility of a contiguous Palestinian state. Demographic trends, local politics, and geopolitical shifts further complicate the implementation of this solution. Israeli public opinion has shifted, showing a decline in support for the two-state solution, largely due to security concerns and skepticism about the viability of a peaceful coexistence with a Palestinian state (AUSTIN et EVAN, 2023). As the prospect of a two-state solution dims, alternative visions such as a one-state solution have gained some traction, though they come with their own set of challenges and resistances. This shift reflects a broader reevaluation of potential pathways to peace, amidst the changing dynamics of regional and international politics.

This article explores the intricate dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, offering a thorough analysis of the historical and current negotiations between the two parties. It examines the internal and external factors shaping each side's position, the effects of regional geopolitics, and provides a detailed exploration of the two-state solution. Through this in-depth review, it becomes clear that achieving peace is a complex challenge, demanding significant changes in strategy and perspective to reach a fair and enduring resolution.

2- Transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Path to Peace

Since more than five decades of negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis, it became clear to us that both sides of the conflict are not ready to achieve peace, and that each side is waiting for future changes that could allow it to impose its point of view on the other and achieve gains that are unattainable under the current circumstances (BEN-AMI, 2019). On the Palestinian side, the split between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas has led to a weakening of the Palestinian position and the absence of a clear vision of what Palestinians want from the peace process (ROBINSON, 2024). The Palestinian Authority, which accepted the Oslo Accords on the basis that they would allow it to return to the land of the West Bank and Gaza and to continue the struggle to realize the hopes of the Palestinian people to establish their independent state, has failed to achieve these goals for a variety of reasons, chief among them Israeli intransigence, but also mismanagement and corruption in the Palestinian administration and the failure of the Palestinian Authority to find a clear national project around which the Palestinian people can rally (KHALIDI, 2006).

Similarly, the emergence of extremist Islamic movements, their control over the Gaza Strip (BROWN, 2016), their multiple wars with Israel, and above all their negative attitudes towards certain Arab countries, particularly the Gulf States, and their involvement in the Iranian axis have led to a decline in Arab support for the Palestinian cause (FEUUR, ZIBLER, 2018), thereby dismantling the Arab-Israeli conflict and reducing it to a Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Indeed, Hamas's proximity to Iran, based on a religious view of the conflict (YARRI, 2010) and its calling for the elimination of Israel, at the expense of its Arab membership, and its stance against the Gulf Arab states especially against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates concerning the Iranian expansion in the Middle East, began to reflect negatively on the Palestinian question, prompting these countries to stop supporting their cause and to make a major change in their view of this issue, which according to the Economist (2021), has no longer an Arab national dimension, but became an issue confined to the Palestinian people. This was evident in the normalization agreements signed with Israel by the Emirates and Bahrain. Thus, we see that the options have become very narrow for the Palestinians. The decline of American and Arab interest in the Palestinian cause has left them alone against Israel and has brought their cause back, once again, to the refugee issue (SCHEINDLIN, 2020).

Without Arab support, the Palestinian issue risks becoming a mere refugee problem rather than a national cause. Hamas's reliance on Iranian support for military power, including long-range missiles, is risky. If Iran's regional influence grows, Hamas might gain control over the Palestinian Authority and strengthen its position against Israel. However, if Iran's influence wanes, Hamas could lose both Iranian and Arab support, leading to possible unilateral Israeli actions, such as annexing the West Bank and further marginalizing the Palestinian issue (SHAUL et SELA, 2002). On the Israeli side, the situation is completely different. Israel, which has refused to make concessions to achieve a just and comprehensive peace (KODMANI, 2008), has nevertheless been able to achieve important things that seemed impossible a few years earlier, thanks to the absolute support it has received from the Trump administration (2017-2021) by moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, turning a blind eye to settlement operations in the West Bank, including through normalization agreements with some Arab countries. Israel has exploited the expansion of Iranian influence in the region and the threat that this influence poses to it on the one hand, and to the Arab states of the Gulf on the other, in order to draw closer to the latter and try to contain the Iranian threat. Indeed, without this threat, it would have been very difficult for Arab countries to accept normalization agreements with Israel (ASSBURG, HANKEL, 2021) without guaranteeing a minimum level of Palestinian rights. Israel felt at the height of its power: it has a large military force that allows it to defend itself, and there is no longer a direct existential threat from Arab countries through traditional (symmetrical) wars between states, as happened in 1973. Egypt and Jordan have signed peace agreements with Israel, while Syria and Iraq no longer pose significant threats due to internal turmoil. Israel felt secure with its advanced air defense against Hamas, and is shifting focus to normalization with Gulf states, seeing less need for further Palestinian negotiations. The primary concern for Israel is countering the Iranian threat. To this end, Israel looks to coordinate with the Gulf Arab countries to find common ground against Iran and is trying to pressure the United States not to reach a new agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue (WIESS, 2011), because it is aware of the magnitude of the danger that would be posed by the acquisition by Iran of a nuclear weapon (WALLACE, 2021).

3-The two-state solution

The international community first learned of a two-state solution through United Nations Resolution 181, adopted in November 1947. This resolution proposed dividing Palestine, then under British mandate, into two separate and independent states: Israel and Palestine. Even though that resolution was adopted by the UN, it was rejected by the Arab leaders and governments who opposed the creation and establishment of a Jewish state (WILLIAM, 2011) on the Palestinian land. Trough the history of that conflict, the two-state solution was built according to the several UN resolution based on the principles represented in particular by international Resolutions 242 and 338, which affirmed that in order to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, Israel would have to withdraw from the lands it occupied in 1967 and return to the so-called June 4 borders, in order to establish on these lands a Palestinian state that would exchange mutual recognition with Israel. But is this solution, long sought by mediators, still possible?

In fact, the presentation of the two-state solution is now facing serious challenges. In the West Bank and East Jerusalem, the number of settlers has grown to approximately 700,000 who control about 30 percent of the West Bank's land (UN, 2021), and this raises fundamental doubts about the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state on land that is geographically fragmented. Demographics, local politics and geopolitical trends on both sides of the conflict also indicate that over time these changes will deepen, violating the fundamental principles that have defined the parameters of the two-state solution for several decades (DEJERJIAN et Al, 2018). This will expose the various parties involved in resolving this conflict to more challenges and instability. On the other hand, this solution also faces fundamental differences between Palestinians and Israelis on central issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, borders and security (CARTER CENTER, 2002).

The divisions between the West Bank and Gaza, as well as political conflicts between Palestinian factions, have not contributed to a comprehensive and clear Palestinian national project (SAEEDI et Al., 2024), especially at the beginning of the Oslo Accords, when it was possible to implement this solution, before the issue of settlements was exacerbated and the confiscation of a large part of the West Bank land for settler housing took place. The separation between the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority and Gaza strip under Hamas made the Palestinian position very week and participated in the evolution of the conflict with Israel into a religious conflict following the several wars between Hamas and Israel (MISHAL, 1996), (HASS, 2007). This tremendous situation between the Palestinians has led to the absence of a unified national vision that could have provided a pressure element at this stage to impose the two-state solution. Israel therefore exploited the disintegration of the Palestinian position to buy time and derail the solution (ZARTMAN, 2011), (HASS, 2017).

On the Israeli side, public opinion revolves around the core issues of the conflict: Jerusalem, settlements and security. Opinion polls show that the two-state solution is no longer supported by Israelis as it was in the past (AUSTIN et EVAN, 2023), although they have no alternative vision. According to a National Security Index survey conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies, the percentage of Israeli support for the establishment of a Palestinian state has declined over the past decade. In 2008, it stood at 46%, then rose to 58% in 2010, and dropped to 43% in 2017 (SHER, 2018). This position is confirmed by Yehuda Ben-Meir, a researcher at Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies, who writes: "Press reports say that Palestinians oppose the 'two states for two peoples' formula in any future settlement with Israel and insist on supporting only the 'two-state' formula. The discussion here is about the heart of the conflict, not the wording or the words, and Israel is not allowed to compromise on this or even discuss it, under any circumstances and in any case, because it is linked to our real existence" (KHATIB, 2013).

Similarly, Professor Yehuda Shenhav, a sociologist at Tel Aviv University, called for the adoption of the one-state option, considering that the two-state solution has become unfeasible due to Israeli policies, especially with regard to settlements and land annexation, and that the optimal solution to the Palestinian question is a one state democratic solution guaranteeing citizenship rights to all its inhabitants. He considers that the general political scene in the Middle East makes the two-state solution unfeasible and poses a great danger to the Palestinians in Israel (ATAMAN, 2024). He also believes that the positions of Israeli leaders, parties and public opinion regarding the vision of the two-state solution are based on the non-implementation of this vision. Reinforcing this view are Israeli measures on the ground to expand settlements, impose geographic and demographic facts on the West Bank, accelerate the Judaization of Jerusalem and build the separation wall. All these measures show the extent to which Israeli public opinion is deviating towards rigidity on central issues such as settlements and Jerusalem (PELED, 2011). It has become clear, nowadays to both Palestinians and Israelis that a two-state solution that meets the minimum needs of both societies is impossible.

Over time, and with the failure of the Oslo Accords to achieve the desired two-state solution, Palestinian support for it has waned and attitudes have begun to harden. There is a majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza who believe that in the end, the Palestinian people will get all of Palestine back on the basis that "God is with them" and that the demographic factor is in their interest (STAFF, 2022), as their numbers will eventually outnumber those of the Jews, allowing them to regain "their full right to historic Palestine and any settlement will only be temporary" (POLLOCK, 2019). Moreover, Israeli positions and actions on the ground have made the two-state solution impossible to implement, as it no longer guarantees the minimum required for the establishment of a genuine Palestinian state that meets Palestinian aspirations (HARPAZ, 2017). This has prompted the parties involved to rethink other alternatives for achieving a lasting peace agreement. In Israeli society, security concerns remain one of the most important factors preventing Israelis from pursuing a two-state solution. The majority` of Israelis view the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank as a direct threat to Israel's security (CARROLL, 2024), especially given the issue of geography and demography. In fact, the establishment of a Palestinian state will be accompanied by an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, which will, in time, lead to the collapse of Israeli security control over this area, especially on its eastern border with Jordan, and thus expose Israel to great existential risks, since the external threats could become close to Israel's strategic depth (SULLIVAN, 2012). On the other hand, Israel is unlikely to allow the Palestinian state to establish a military force on a sovereign basis (SAYIGH, 1995), and in all negotiations Israel demands the disarming of the Palestinian state of heavy weapons as a clear precondition for any solution. This would allow it, should an existential problem arise, to re-occupy the entire territory of the Palestinian state without much resistance. However, since the experiences of the multiple Gaza wars have shown that reoccupation would be costly in terms of human casualties even if the other side is disarmed, so Israel prefers to reject the two-state solution altogether because of the lack of trust between the two sides (RUDOREN, 2014). In addition, the presence of approximately 1.5 million Palestinians within the 1948 territories poses a potential threat to Israel's security. If a Palestinian state is established and clashes occur between the two states, these Palestinians inside Israel might act against Israel from within, representing a significant danger to the country's security (COHEN, 2010).

Thus, fears are growing in Israel, and Israelis are trying to find alternative solutions that they believe are less dangerous for the future of the Jewish state. If a two-state solution is the only solution, Israel will accept it only if it achieves its own goals and offers what it deems acceptable to the Palestinians. (ZARTMAN, 2011).

The last deal that was made concerning the conflict was the deal of the Century. Indeed, following the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States in 2017, his administration made efforts to achieve a lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Trump expressed a personal commitment to the issue and engaged with various leaders, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sissi, and King Abdullah II of Jordan, before meeting with Palestinian Authority President Mahmud Abbas. The American administration pushed for Israel to freeze settlements in the West Bank and urged the Palestinian Authority to address extremism (KERSHNER 2017). Trump entrusted his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, with the peace efforts, leading to the proposal of the "Deal of the Century" on January 28, 2020. This plan, based on a two-state solution, proposed a limited and demilitarized Palestinian state with conditions heavily favoring Israeli security concerns. It required the Palestinians to recognize Israel as a Jewish state, combat terrorism according to Israeli standards, and allow Israeli security operations within the Palestinian state. The plan also promised significant financial aid to the Palestinians if they accepted these terms (HALBFINGER and CROWLEY 2020). The proposal was met with widespread rejection from the Palestinians and the Arab League, which saw it as biased towards Israeli demands and failing to respect Palestinian rights. The Palestinian Authority and various resistance factions rejected the plan, leading to protests in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (HOLMES and SAWAFTA). The Arab League's official stance opposed the plan, citing the need to uphold Palestinian sovereignty and rights (KINGSLEY 2020). However, some Gulf states viewed the plan as a potential path to peace due to their strategic concerns about Iranian influence in the region.

With the end of Trump's presidency and the failure of the "Deal of the Century" to bring peace, the Biden administration shifted its Middle East priorities, focusing less on the Palestinian issue. Despite briefly re-engaging due to the conflict between Israel and Hamas in May 2021, the Biden administration has shown little interest in pursuing a new peace initiative. This disinterest, combined with ongoing Israeli annexation of West Bank land, has made the two-state solution increasingly unviable (BEAUCHAMP, 2021).

4- Conclusion

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains one of the most intricate and enduring disputes of our time, deeply rooted in historical, political, and social complexities. Despite numerous negotiation attempts and various peace processes, a lasting resolution has eluded both parties. Central to the conflict is the tension between Palestinian aspirations for statehood and Israeli security and territorial concerns. Internal divisions within the Palestinian leadership, alongside Israeli strategic alliances and geopolitical maneuvers, have further complicated peace efforts.

The two-state solution, once the cornerstone of peace efforts, now faces severe challenges due to the expansion of Israeli settlements, fragmented Palestinian territories, and shifting political dynamics. Demographic trends and changing local and international politics have also undermined its feasibility. Public opinion on both sides shows a declining belief in the viability of this solution, with some exploring alternatives, such as a one-state solution, though these also face significant obstacles.

The "Deal of the Century" proposed by the Trump administration, heavily favoring Israeli security concerns and requiring significant Palestinian concessions, was rejected by Palestinian leaders and the Arab League, further diminishing hopes for a negotiated two-state solution. The plan’s failure and the subsequent shift in U.S. priorities under the Biden administration have left the peace process at an impasse. The Israeli Knesset's overwhelming vote against recognizing a Palestinian state has reinforced the perception that a two-state solution is increasingly unattainable.

The path to peace in this conflict remains full of challenges. The two-state solution, long considered the primary path to resolution by many countries, appears increasingly unlikely following the recent Knesset vote after the war of October 7, 2023). Other potential solutions, such as a one secular state or one binational state, remain on the table but are still far from being realized.

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