The Proof of the Endless Consciousness

Consciousness is a phenomenon that is still unexplained to this day. There is intensive research into how it arises. But is this the right approach at all? Isn't consciousness much more a permanent being that only changes over time? Immediately thereafter, there is the question of whether consciousness is endless or not. Can an endlessness of consciousness be proven?

Both, that consciousness is a permanent and endless being, are proven in this text whereby the existing laws of thought, such as the law of noncontradiction, are used.

Starting from the consideration that - starting from the being - the being and the nothing must "be the case" at the same time in other respects, the existence of a complete space is inferred in the first chapter. Then a discussion about the structure of the space follows. Further the notion of the spaceless is introduced and its meaning emphasized, especially in relation to the space. A fundamental analysis of time and temporal comparisons ensues in order to arrive at the first climax of the text, the everything-stays-proof. This shows that everything that has existed, stays. The chapter finishes by answering the questions whether a first unit of time exists and how time proceeds.

The second chapter, which has consciousness as the main subject of investigation, begins with the analysis of the personal identity. “What am I?” is the central question that is being discussed. Then the essence of the movement, the co-determination and the essence of the will are explained, as well as the certainty about the future and the question of happiness, the latter including the question of whether there is a way to become happier and happier. Finally the essence of the consciousness with its permanent existence is proven.

In the third and last chapter, the question of God's existence is dealt with first. It is demonstrated that a pantheistic God with consciousness exists, as well as the demon hypothesis examined. Lastly follows the proof of the endlessness of every existing consciousness.

1. Space and time

The relativity of space and time has been the recognized scientific view of space and time since Albert Einstein's (1879-1955) discoveries. Furthermore, the relativity of space and time has been experimentally proven and applied in technical achievements of mankind, as in satellite navigation. In this first chapter descriptions and imaginations of a space and a time are given in which the relativity of space and time can be embedded.

1.1. How is the space built up?

At the beginning the question of all questions "Why is there something and not nothing?" (Leibniz, quoted after Hauswald/Lemanski/Schubbe 2013: 7) is considered in a different way: Can something “be the case” and at the same time and in another respect not “be the case”? Whether something can both be and at the same time and in the same respect not be, can be denied with the law of non-contradiction "It is impossible that the same thing belong and not belong to the same thing at the same time and in the same respect.” (Aristoteles, quoted after Beisbart 2010: 1) But what about if the being is “considered“ from a different respect than the nothing? Could then “both” “be the case“ at the same time?

The fact that - starting from the being - “both”, the being and the nothing, must “be the case” at the same time and in different respect, results from the fact that the being and the nothing in themselves have the same right to “be the case“, and therefore either “both” must not “be the case“ or “both” must “be the case“. The same right to “be the case” results from the fact that there is no external cause, neither for “being the case” of the being nor for “being the case” of the nothing. The same applies to a causa sui at which something is the cause of its own being (Eisler 1904: 177): It could not be just as well as it could be. It is impossible that “both” “are not the case” due to the law of excluded middle, which as an ontological principle states that there is no third between being and nothing (Zoglauer 2016: 25).

The different respects result from the following: Due to the existing extension of the being, which should "be the case" as the nothing at the same time and in other respects, this must be the empty space which has extension and in itself - considered alone - should "be the case" as the nothing. The extension of the empty space is infinite (- see the proof of the infinity of the space in this subchapter -), which means that it remains indefinite and thus lets the empty space "be the case" in this perspective as the nothing. However, every form of the empty space has the same right to “be the case“ and that at every location. Because there is no cause (- it is here and in the following the real sphere, which is why the term “reason” from the ideal sphere is not used, also because - as we will see in the second chapter - everything that exists for us belongs to the real sphere -) why a certain empty space should exist at a location. This is also the case, because the empty space is also independent of everything assumptively existing spaceless. Spaceless is everything assumptively existing which has no spatial extension. (An investigation of the independence of assumptively existing spaceless to the space can be found in the second chapter in the subchapter “What is the will?”.) There can also exist several forms of empty space at one location because an empty space - considered alone - “is the case” as the nothing with what nothing “is the case” at the location and thus something can still exist at the location. This is a prerequisite for the possibility of a complete space, which is presented below. There, the being exists in another respect, namely by comparing the different empty spaces with each other. The human with his consciousness is here only located in the being, in the being that surrounds him. That is why the human is, "is the case" and not at the same time and in other respects "is not the case". (It should be mentioned here that no observer can exist who has the view of the empty space as the nothing since he himself would have to "be the case" as the nothing for that because if he "were not the case" as the nothing, comparisons would exist and thus the something and not the nothing would "be the case", which contradicts itself here. So the nothing "is" only "the case", in order to preserve the same right at "being the case" of the nothing and at "being the case" of the something.)

The objection that the nothing is not even allowed to "be the case" as an "indefinite extension" must be countered that this is the only possibility at which the something and the nothing "are the case" at the same time and in different respects, in order to fulfill the same right of "being the case of the something and the nothing". Because from assumptively existing spaceless, which possesses no extension and whose spaceless properties would have to "be the case" at the same time and in other respects as the nothing in order to fulfill the same right of "being the case of the something and the nothing", no extension, no space can become existent since there is no cause in the assumptively existing spaceless from which extension, space could become existent.

The existence of the empty space also answers the question of the substance, the question of what substance the space, which comprises everything that has extension, consists. The substance is the empty space in its various forms, which also have different compressions and stretchings. These different compressions and stretchings are the colors - or also called space densities - of the reality. The space densities are each three-dimensional by their height, width and depth whereby the determinations of these three designations are relative. The three-dimensionality results from the fact that everything two-dimensional has a minimal extension into the third dimension because otherwise it would not exist. For example, a two-dimensional plane given in - without loss of generality, hereinafter referred to as wlog - width and depth, has a minimal height because otherwise it would not have a width or depth if viewed from the three-dimensional perspective.

This paragraph serves for a more precise description and illustration of the notion of the space density: Space densities are the building blocks of parts of the space. Parts of the space consist of space densities. A space density can have a spatial extension of a kilometer (or larger) or only the size of an atom (or smaller). Furthermore, the space density can have any possible form. Every space density consists of exactly one density. That means: The spatial extension of a space density has only a certain compression or stretching, namely the color of the space density. Further, each space density is divisible. The following example can be used as an imagination of a change of a space density - viewed macroscopically: A rubber band that is being strechted. This has a different space density before being stretched than afterwards. This has epistemological correctness because the change in wavelength of the light reflected on the rubber band as well as the resulting image of the rubber band in the head are not recognizable to the person in question; the rubber band that is in front of the person in question is only recognizable. This is discussed in more detail in the second chapter, the essence of a change in 1.3.

The respect in which only nothing “is the case”, results from the fact that the same density also exists at every location, so that in this respect only superimposed, infinitely great extended nothings of a density "are the case” which - solely viewed for themselves - "are the case" as the nothing.

The completeness of the space follows from the fact that every form of the empty space has the same right to “be the case”, and that at every location. Thus the completeness of the space can be defined as follows: The completeness of the space or - in other words - the space exists in such a way that every conceivable space density exists superimposed at every location. (This is only possible, if the substance is the empty space in its various forms because only this - solely viewed - "is the case" as the nothing and allows several forms of itself as "being the case", as existing at a location.) The existence of the complete space with all its superimpositions is also compatible with the law of non-contradiction, because only something should exist at the same time and in the same respect and not something should and should not exist at the same time and in the same respect.

The infinity of the space follows from the completeness of the space. Because of the completeness of the space, at the location x which assumptively only ends a finite space due to the existence of a wlog small round red space density there, there must also be a much larger than this small round red space density, wlog angular blue space density' (in the form of a equilateral triangle) because it has the same right to exist at the location x - more precisely: with the same "midpoint" x -; and at the location of the protruding (- protruding in comparison to the small round red space density -) corner of the angular blue space density', every other space density has the same right to exist, etc., from which the infinity of the space follows.

Another proof of the infinity of the space results from the following: The fact that there are finite parts of the space that do not exist on their own can be observed in reality: The observer A is a certain part of the space and due to the existing distance from other parts of the space to him which he is not, the certain part of the space which the observer A is, exists together with neighbors. Due to the fact that there are observers who are a finite - no matter how big - part of the space, but are otherwise like observer A, this means, that they are one with observer A and here only differ in size and in being of their parts of space from observer A, these observers must exist together with neighbors. From this it follows that the space must be infinitely large, also due to the also existing independence of the assumptively existing spaceless to the space (- see subchapter 2.4. -).

The question here is whether the space is contiguous or not. Contiguous means that there is not something else between two parts of the space that has extension, but is not a part of the space. The fact that the space is contiguous follows from the given definition, because either two parts of the space adjoin each other, that is, are adjacent, or otherwise there is an extension between them, which characterizes a further part of the space.

Our current observable universe, which - according to current scientific knowledge - is of finite size, is only a real part of the infinite space (- see for details 1.6. -).

The compatibility of the completeness of the space with the reality becomes clearer in the further course of the text. In order to bring the notion of the superimposition closer to the reader, a description of a simple superimposition is given below which is presented from a first-person perspective, so that the reader can empathize with it (- Note: In the further course of the work used first-person perspectives serve to make the reader imagine something from his first-person perspective. If a first-person perspective is used to express the author's point of view, this is explicitly mentioned -): It is dark outside, the shutters are up, I am sitting in a room with the light shining and looking out of the window, behind which is a wall. I now recognize at the location behind the window the wall as well as what is reflected from the room. This, in turn, has epistemological correctness because the image of the room in my head that is created by the reflected light is not recognizable for me, but the described superimposition that is in front of me is recognizable. This is again discussed in more detail in the second chapter.

The previous can be summarized in the following sentence: The space which includes everything that has extension, exists in such a way that every conceivable space density exists superimposed at every location.

1.2. Does spaceless exist?

Spaceless is - as already mentioned - everything assumptively existing that has no spatial extension. (- Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804) was close to this definition with his one of the noumenon in a positive meaning, which designates an object of non-sensual intuition (Kant 1974: 277). -) The entity of the spaceless could also be divided into several different entities, so that in addition to the entity of the space and an entity of the spaceless´, another entity of the spaceless´´ and another entity of the spaceless´´´ etc. exist. The entity of the spaceless´ is not the space, as well as not the spaceless´´ or the spaceless´´´ etc., and the entity of the spaceless´´ is not the space, as well as not the spaceless´ or the spaceless´´´ etc.

Here the question arises whether the spaceless´, the spaceless´´, the spaceless´´´ etc. each have to be complete, just as the space is. This is supported by the fact that no entity can select parts of its complete being without that the remaining parts of its complete being exist. A random (- not in the sense of a non-necessity, but in the sense of an objective randomness, i.e. dependent on no cause -) existence of only certain parts of an entity is also impossible because every random existence of certain parts of an entity has the same right to exist as any other random existence of other parts of the entity, also due to the lack of a cause for the existence of only certain parts of an entity (which will become clearer in the subchapter 2.4. when examining the independence of the spaceless to the space). (This line of argument is hereinafter called "equal randomness", which plays an important role in the further course of the text.) It follows that every existing entity must be complete.

From what has been shown that every existing entity must be complete, the possibility of the superimposition of parts of the space follows because if superimpositions in space were impossible, the entity space would not be complete and therefore could not exist, which is a contradiction to reality, because extension exists.

Spaceless - starting from this - also has the same right to "be the case" as the nothing and therefore must be the nothing at the same time and in another respect. This is possible because of the lack of extension of the spaceless whereby the spaceless is the nothing in this other respect, if it or its parts, if they exist, - considered alone - "are the case" as the nothing in terms of content. Regardless of whether spaceless exists or not, there would be no imbalance between the number of existing entities and the nothing which “is” only once “the case”, for the following reasons: If the spaceless exists and the nothing "is the case" in another respect due to the same right to “be the case”, then the nothing “belonging” to the spaceless would be identical to the nothing that “belongs” to the space, with what only a nothing would "be the case". If in this respect the spaceless and the space are considered as one entity, then the balance between the number of existing entities and the nothing would be restored in a 1:1-ratio. If, on the other hand, the spaceless does not exist, then a nothing would “face” an entity, the space.

It should be noted that the spaceless - regardless of whether it has parts or not - cannot exist in the space, for the following reason: If the spaceless would exist in the space, then it would have the same right to exist at any location with which the spatial extension of the space would be describable by neighboring spaceless, but this is impossible because something spaceless which by definition has no spatial extension, can never form a spatial extension by being adjacent to each other.

The author can neither prove nor refute the existence of the spaceless until now, but he was able to show that from the existence of the spaceless its completeness would follow.

1.3. What is time?

After the space has been discussed, also with regard to its structure, its completeness and its complement, the spaceless, an analysis of time now follows. Consider our current universe, a real part of the space. This universe changes. A changed universe - hereinafter called universe* - becomes existing, which differs in at least a part from the previous one, because otherwise there would be identity between the universe and the universe* and so there would be no change. Building on this, time can now be defined: Time is a certain number of changes. A change (- or also called a time unit -) is given if an individual who is a part of the complete space, becomes another part of the complete space and this then is. So time exists for changing individuals to which also the changing universe belongs, also because time is conceivable and consistent in the whole complete space and everything conceivable which is always consistent, exists in the whole complete space because everything conceivable has the same right to "be the case" as well as its non-existence in another respect and also because of the also existing independence of the spaceless to the space (- see subchapter 2.4. -).

However, time can not only be defined with space as the basis, but also with spaceless. Here, the definition of a time unit is as follows: A spaceless time unit is given, if an individual who is a part of the spaceless, becomes another part of the spaceless. So spaceless time is a certain number of spaceless time units. The general time can be defined from the given definitions: The general time is a certain number of general time units. A general time unit is, if an individual who is a part of an entity, becomes another part of an entity. The question that arises here is whether this becoming must take place within one entity or whether it can also take place between different entities. Examples of the latter would be a becoming from “being a part of the space” to “being a part of the spaceless” or, conversely, a becoming from “being a part of the spaceless” to “being a part of the space”. This question is answered in subchapter 2.4. whereby its answer being incidental to clarify the permanent existence of consciousness and to prove that consciousness will continue to exist endlessly. In the further course, neither the spaceless time nor the general time are important, but the time because the latter is sufficient to prove these two main problems.

Now the definition of time is justified. The future does not yet exist, it continually occurs anew and becomes the new present. For this to be the case, it cannot - as already mentioned above - be the same part of the space, something must become a different part of the space. If this other part of the space matches in parts with the previous part of the space, then no time unit has occurred for these matching parts, but on the whole a time unit has occurred. Therefore new time units arise because the future does not yet exist, but will be existing (- see subchapter 3.2. in which the endless time is proved -), and thus the time units, as well as time, are discrete and not continuous. Thus the essence of the time was worked out using a definition of the individual and its discrete nature was emphasized.

1.4. What are spatial and temporal comparisons?

The notions “space” and “time” are now defined and can be used for the analysis of comparisons which make the being existing. The notion "spatial comparison" was already defined above without this naming, also because it was not yet possible to distinguish it from the "temporal comparison" which exists with the time. The general definition is as follows: A spatial comparison is a comparison between two different parts of the space. These parts of the space can be adjacent or not adjacent. An example of a spatial comparison in which the parts of the space are adjacent is the comparison between a red cuboid and a blue cuboid adjacent to it. Here, the parts of the space are single space densities according to the definition. The possibility and existence of a spatial comparison between two parts of the space which are not adjacent to each other, results from the reality in which an observer recognizes, for example, three different space densities which are adjacent to each other, whereby the two space densities which are not adjacent to each other are also being compared with each other.

A temporal comparison is a comparison between a part of the space and another part of the space that follows in time. These two parts of the space can be adjacent in time or non-adjacent in time. An example of the former is the comparison between a yellow and a subsequent green sphere, an example of the latter is, if a blue sphere follows the green sphere from the first example and the yellow and blue spheres are compared with each other. It follows from the definition that a temporal comparison can contain spatial comparisons, but not vice versa, which means that a spatial comparison can not contain temporal comparisons. The notions “time” respectively “time unit” differ from the notion "temporal comparison" insofar as that time and time unit are special temporal comparisons. Time units are a subset of all existing temporal comparisons.

A question that arises here, is whether a single spatial comparison and a single temporal comparison make the same quantity of being existing. The answer is that a single spatial comparison - as in the example with the red and blue cuboid - creates a being of quantity two in the form of the two comparative components, a single temporal comparison - as in the example with the yellow and the green sphere - also creates a being of quantity two in the form of the two comparative components. Here in the example, the yellow sphere before the temporal comparison “is” as a single spatial density as a nothing “the case”, and the green sphere only exists through a temporal comparison with the yellow sphere whereby the yellow sphere receives its being.

The following example is intended to introduce the notion of "existentially-higher-existent". Now consider a yellow-red sphere which is in equal parts yellow on the left and red on the right. So there is a spatial adjacent comparison between the yellow and the red hemisphere. Now the yellow-red sphere is followed in time by a green sphere. This green sphere exists existentially higher than the yellow-red sphere because it is determined by more comparisons, comes into being, into existence by more comparisons than the yellow-red sphere. This is the case because the temporal comparison between the yellow-red and the green sphere contains the spatial comparison of the yellow-red sphere. The general definition is thus: A part of the space A exists existentially higher (- or: exists existentially more -) than another part of the space B, if the part of the space A is determined by more comparisons than the part of the space B. This results in the following definition: A part of the space A exists existentially the highest (- or: exists existentially the most -), if the part of the space A exists existentially higher (- or: exists existentially more -) than all other parts of the space. This is exactly the case, if the part of the space A is determined by the most comparisons among all considered parts of the space.

By introducing the notions “spatial comparison” and “temporal comparison”, the definition of existentially-higher-existent and of existentially-highest-existent could be set up which are not only in the next subchapter of great importance, but also in the entire further course of the text.

1.5. Does everything stay?

The previous example is now taken up again and considered from a new point of view: The yellow-red sphere exists as a part of the temporal comparison between it and the green sphere that follows in time. What can we generally say from that about what existed? Will it stay or will it no longer exist?

The following everything-stays-proof shows that everything that has existed, stays. This also means that everyone's experiences stay. Be any part of the space A considered that is an individual. It is shown by means of case distinction that this being of the part of the space A stays:

1st case: The individual who is the part of the space A, becomes the part of the space A´, so it changes from being the part of the space A to being the part of the space A´. Then the change consists of being the part of the space A and of being the part of the space A´, and of the change from being the part of the space A to being the part of the space A´. So the being of the part of the space A stays in this case (existent), even if the subsequent being of the part of the space A´ has become existing because the being of the part of the space A is part of the change.

Here, it should be emphasized that there is no violation of the law of non-contradiction because the being of the part of the space A that stays, does not at the same time and in the same respect not stay; but does not stay, thus changes with regard to the change from being the part of the space A to being the part of the space A´ of which the being of the part of the space A is a staying part.

2nd case: The individual who is the part of the space A, would no longer change, so the being of the part of the space A would no longer change. Then there would be no subsequent being of a part of the space A´ and so there would be no change. In this case, the being of the part of the space A would stay.

The fact that this case distinction is sufficient and no further cases must be distinguished follows from the law of excluded middle, which states that for any proposition P the proposition “P or not P” is true. Applied to the proof, the law of excluded middle is that the proposition "being the part of the space A is part of a change or it is not the case that being the part of the space A is part of a change" is true.

Be any existing event x considered. An event contains at least a temporal comparison in contrast to a state, such as being a part of the space. It is shown by case distinction that the event x which an individual is, stays, that means that the being of event x stays:

1st case: The individual who is event x, becomes the part of the space y, so it changes from being event x to being the part of the space y. Then the change consists of being event x and of being the part of the space y, and of the change from being event x to being the part of the space y. So the being of event x stays in this case (existent), even if the subsequent being of the part of the space y has become existing because the being of event x is part of the change.

2nd case: The individual who is event x, would no longer change, so the being of event x would no longer change. Then there would be no subsequent being of a part of the space y and so there would be no change. In this case, the being of event x would stay.

In the two second cases, the conditional simple is used, because the being of the part of the space A respectively the being of event x are always part of a subsequent change at an always advancing time which will be shown in the further course.

The case distinction, whether the being of event x followed by a being of event x´ or not, is not presented because it is false according to the definition because the temporal comparisons that an event contains, must be recognized successively or, if an individual is these temporal comparisons, must be experienced successively by it. New events arise inter alia through the temporal comparison between the being of event x and the being of the part of the space y and through temporal comparisons to being the subsequent parts of the space. For example, from being event x and from the temporally subsequent being of the part of the space y results a new being of event x*, which has more temporal comparisons than the being of event x, and then the everything-stays-proof can be applied again to the being of event x*.

Furthermore, the everything-stays-proof is also correct for spaceless. For the proof, the above given definition of the spaceless time unit is used and the two possible cases are again distinguished:

1st case: The individual who would be a part α of the spaceless, would become another part β of the spaceless, so it would change from being the part α of the spaceless to being the part β of the spaceless. Then the change would consist of being the part α of the spaceless and of being the part β of the spaceless, and of the change from being the part α of the spaceless to being the part β of the spaceless. So the being of the part α of the spaceless would stay in this case (existent), even if the subsequent being of the part β of the spaceless has become existing because the being of the part α of the spaceless would be part of the change.

2nd case: The individual who would be the part α of the spaceless, would no longer change, so the being of the part α of the spaceless would no longer change. Then there would be no subsequent being of a part β of the spaceless and so there would be no change. In this case, the being of the part α of the spaceless would stay.

In both cases of the everything-stays-proof for spaceless, the conditional simple is used because the existence of spaceless is neither proved nor refuted.

For the two other cases at which the individual who would be a part α of the spaceless or an event x not encompassing an extension, would become a part of space y, or the individual who would be a part of space A or an event x encompassing an extension, would become a part β of the spaceless, the everything-stays-proof would be true analogously with which all cases are settled, even since an entity either has extension or not according to the law of excluded middle.

An everyday and an abstract example will now be given, in order to make the previous everything-stays-proof more understandable and to apply it.

Consider a state of consciousness A of any individual. There, consciousness is, if at least something spatially extended exists for one. (The notion of consciousness is discussed in greater detail in the second chapter.) Accordingly, a state of consciousness is, if at least something spatially extended exists for one that does not change. The state of consciousness A changes to the state of consciousness B, which means, inter alia, that the individual who is also parts of the state of consciousness A, becomes parts of the state of consciousness B. The individual is not necessarily the entire state of consciousness, but it can also only be parts of it because things in themselves can belong to the state of consciousness which the individual is not. (More on this in the second chapter.) Then a change consists of being parts of the state of consciousness A and of being parts of the state of consciousness B, as well as of the change from being parts of the state of consciousness A to being parts of the state of consciousness B. So the being of parts of the state of consciousness A stays in this case because the being of parts of the state of consciousness A is part of the change. There, the being of parts of the state of consciousness B is determined by more comparisons than the being of parts of the state of consciousness A, namely because the being of parts of the state of consciousness B is determined by all the comparisons contained in the being of parts of the state of consciousness A plus by its own contained comparisons and the new temporal comparisons they created with what the being of parts of the state of consciousness B exists existentially higher than the being of parts of the state of consciousness A. This matches with observations of the reality in which the being of parts of the state of consciousness B “is more there” - or expressed by definition: exists existentially higher - than the being of parts of the state of consciousness A. The “being more there” or the existentially-higher-existence does not only exist for the being of parts of the state of consciousness B compared to the being of parts of the state of consciousness A, but also analogously for the being of the entire state of consciousness B compared to the being of the entire state of consciousness A to which things in themselves can belong that the individual in question is not. This in turn matches with observations of the reality with what the everything-stays-proof can be applied to the entire reality, also because after the occurrence of the new time unit, everything previous no longer exists alone, but only together with what has just occured.

The more abstract example is as follows: If an individual is something (and so exists) and then, assumptively, this individual would no longer exist, then the individual would have changed to no-longer-exist, which means that it is part of the change “exist -> no-longer-exist" and would therefore continue to exist after the change because of the everything-stays-proof. But this is a contradiction to the assumption after which the individual should no longer exist after the change. From this it can be concluded that an individual that is something (and so exists), must stay existent and that changes towards the no-longer-existence of an individual cannot exist, also because a change must consist of two existing components which an individual is.

The everything-stays-proof also shows that time cannot run backwards because - since everything stays - always something new is added and something that has happened, cannot become less existing, as it would have to be the case if time running backwards. So travelling back in time is impossible.

It has been proven that everything in space and time - any parts of the space and any events - that exists or has existed, stays, as well as that everything complementary spaceless that exists or has existed, stays, from which it follows that everything that exists or has existed, stays. The compatibility of this with the reality was shown by using an example.

1.6. Does a first time unit exist?

After revealing a property of time with the everything-stays-proof, we now turn to the question of whether a beginning of time exists; a question that also concerned Georges Lemaître and whose reflections on it were published in a little-known journal in 1927. This publication contained essential features of the expansion of the universe and made him the founder of the not unproblematic Big Bang theory (von Rauchhaupt 2014). The problems of the popular Big Bang theory, according to which matter, space and time originated about 13.8 billion years ago, are essentially to be found in the very early universe and in the Big Bang itself, for which there are no generally accepted descriptions.

It is now shown why a beginning of the time about 13.8 billion years ago cannot exist. Assumptively this beginning of the time should be considered. Then there is no cause why the time should have started about 13.8 billion years ago, also due to the also existing independence of the spaceless to the space. So a beginning of the time about 13.8 billion years ago and wlog a time unit sooner or later has the same right to exist as a beginning about 13.8 billion years ago, which means that the beginning of the time already existed before a beginning of the time about 13.8 billion years ago.

However, our time can be the time with its course of time (- see also the following subchapter for a detailed discussion of the notion of the course of time -) which just had its beginning about 13.8 billion years ago. Because every time with its course of time with a beginning before any number of time units exists equally as any other time with its course of time with a beginning before any other number of time units. So if our time should have had its beginning about 13.8 billion years ago, then the underlying entity must still have been complete then because of 1.1. and 1.2., so the complete space must already have existed. However, it could be that about 13.8 billion years ago, certain space densities changed more than others and thus (- see the application example in 1.5. -) became existentially higher existent, and over time more and more space densities joined them by having changed comparatively more, ultimately making the present observable expanding finite universe existentially the highest existent. A further expansion of the present universe would then take place analogously. Among other things, the measured background radiations are only changes in what exists existentially the highest.

That, besides the existence of every time with its course of time beginning any number of time units before due to the same right to exist, times with their courses of time without a beginning could also exist, can be ruled out as follows: Consider such a time without a beginning which is a time without a beginning with an infinite number of time units up to the current present. Let's call this time t. Let us now consider a time t* with a beginning, but which already has an infinite number of time units up to the current present, just as many time units as t. This time t* must exist after the second paragraph in this subchapter. (- Note: According to 1.3. there are also individuals who have experienced the time units of t and t*. This will become clearer in the following subchapter. -) We have thus found a time t* with a beginning that encompasses the time t without a beginning with an infinite number of time units up to the present. In this way we always find a time with a beginning that encompasses a time without a beginning.

It could thus be shown that every time has a beginning, even if possibly before an infinite number of time units; and our time may have started about 13.8 billion years ago.

1.7. How does time proceed?

Having shown in 1.5. that time can only run in one direction - towards the future and not towards the past -, and having shown in 1.6. that every time has a beginning, the question of how time proceeds, how time develops, is now examined. At the macroscopic level, the currently recognized view is that time, the change of individuals proceeds deterministically according to the law of cause and effect, whereas on the microscopic level - especially in quantum mechanics - time should change indeterministically according to the objective randomness (Siegmund-Schultze 2011). A deterministic course of time means that the staying previous unambiguously determines what follows in time whereby the staying previous is the sufficient cause for the effect which is what follows in time. In contrast to this, an indeterministic course of time is given, if the staying previous does not unambiguously determines what follows in time; but by an objective randomness this determination is made. An objective randomness would exist, if that what follows in time were independent of the staying previous, i.e. not dependent on any cause, not even on a cause unknown to the subject, as it is the case with subjective randomness (Zeilinger 2003: 44). However, an objective randomness must turn into an equal randomness (- see subchapter 1.2. -) because every conceivable temporal following has the same right to exist as every other conceivable temporal following. Here becomes relevant that a first time unit exists.

Let us now consider an arbitrary part of the space A of the space which is first in time. Then only this first part of the space A which an individual is, exists as a cause for a temporally following part of the space A´ which the individual then becomes. This is where the equal randomness comes to fruition. Because there is not yet a causal chain, a chain of consecutive causes, which could unambiguously determine a temporally following part of the space A´, the part of the space A´ must be selected, determined with the equal randomness. Due to the fact that every part of the space has the same right to be selected as every other because of a missing determining causal chain and at least one should be selected because of the conceivableness of this time (- see subchapter 1.3. -), the equal randomness - again as in 1.2. - occurs here: Each part of the space is selected equally as the temporally following part of the space A´. The individual which is the part of the space A, also becomes the complete space as the temporally following part of the space A´ because this is itself a part of the space. From another respect, from the point of view of a different beginning course of time this individual is as a temporally following part of the space A´ an arbitrary, but real part of the space of the whole complete space and not the remaining part of the whole complete space. Since this is another respect with which the individual is wlog the part of the space X as the temporally follwing part of the space A´ and also at the same time, but in another respect is not the part of the space X, there is also no contradiction to the law of noncontradiction at which is must be the same respect.

But how does time proceed after this first unit of time? Since there is still no sufficient causal chain, no chain of a sufficient number of consecutive causes in the form of the temporally consecutive previous staying parts of the space which could be set as a sufficient cause for the becoming of part of the space A´´, each part of the space of the complete space is equally selected as the temporally subsequent part of the space A´´. Thus, the equal randomness occurs again. After the second time unit, however, there is now a sufficient causal chain which is set as a sufficient cause for the becoming of the part of the space A´´. This setting is justified because it is an existing view that everything staying previous has triggered that what followed in time - here the being of the part of the space A´´. However, for the selection of the part of the space A´´´ which the individual should become after being the part of the space A´´, there is already a causal chain of sufficient many temporally consecutive parts of the space which is one with the previous causal chain and differs itself from the previous causal chain only in certain spatial and temporal comparisons. (This contradicting formulation is explicitly chosen here - contradicting in being one and yet differing - in order to make the reader first aware of being one, and to consider then the differences.) Thus the selection of the part of the space A´´´ is determined (- in contrast to the selection of the part of the space A´´ after the first time unit -), regardless of whether it is unambiguously or not because the selection of the part of the space A´´´ is one with the previous selection of the part of the space A´´ and differs from the previous selection of the part of the space A´´ only in certain spatial and temporal comparisons. So it is an analogy conclusion. This conclusion procedure can also be used here for all following existing time units and for all following time units that become existing. So this is a deterministic course of time, also because all the time units that occur, whether with an unambiguous part of the space or not, are unambiguously determined by preconditions.

For the compatibility of the presented deterministic course of time with the seemingly indeterministic quantum mechanics on the microscopic level, a short approach is now shown. An example here is the radioactive decay which, according to previous physical knowledge, is subject to objective randomness in a non-local realistic theory and would therefore be indeterministic (Benzinger/Röthlein 2021). A local realistic theory is a theory that is both local and realistic.

Locality means that processes in space only have a direct influence on direct spatial neighbors. In the case of non-locality, there is an influence of certain parts of the space on each other whereby these are not directly adjacent to each other. This influence is called entanglement. In the case of an entanglement, a physical system that is composed, e.g. of several particles, is only well-defined considered as a whole and not in parts. This is the case, for example, if the spin of two entangled electrons that are not adjacent to each other, changes at the same time (Zeilinger 2005). Entanglements exist in certain time-encompassing cases because entanglements are conceivable in the whole complete space and everything conceivable exists in the whole complete space (- see subchapter 1.3. -), also since entanglements have the same right "to be the case" as their non-existence. And we exist in such a case with entanglements. Likewise, certain other time-encompassing cases exist in the complete space in which entanglements are impossible. Whether entanglements exist in a time-encompassing case or not, depends only on whether entanglements existed previously in time in the considered case or not. This is because the newly occurring time units in the considered case are one with each other and only differ in certain spatial and temporal comparisons of the previous staying time units.

In (scientific) realism, reality exists independently of the theory that describes it (Psillos 1999). But because - as already mentioned above - an objective randomness turns into an equal randomness because every conceivable randomness is equal to every other conceivable randomness, no unambiguous part of the space would exist existentially the highest after a radioactive decay, but all conceivable possibilities would exist superimposed. However, this does not match with the observations of reality because in reality only one unambiguous part of the space exists existentially the highest. So the explanation for the radioactive decay cannot only be a non-local realistic theory with objective randomness, i.e. with equal randomness. The fact that this must be a realistic theory to a certain extent becomes clear with the help of the following second chapter in which it is shown that things in themselves are recognizable and that the subject with its thinking only has influence to a certain extent on the reality surrounding it.

Thus our existence can only be correctly described by a deterministic non-local realistic theory, also since the existence of non-locality was worked out theoretically by John Stewart Bell in 1964 in Bell's inequality and was confirmed experimentally by Alain Aspect in 1982. Briefly summarized, Bell's inequality states that there cannot be any local hidden variables that would describe reality locally realistic in every case (Embacher 2000). So the radioactive decay as well as the entire quantum mechanics must be deterministically non-locally realistically explainable, also because Bell's inequality remains valid in Hugh Everett III's many-worlds interpretation (Everett 1957) in which certain non-localities can be circumvented and which shows a certain similarity to the equal randomness described above. (- In the many-worlds interpretation, the "many worlds" arise at the points in time at which a collapse of the wave function would otherwise occur according to the Copenhagen interpretation (Vaidman 2021). -) The existing unambiguity at the existentially highest existing part of the space must then have become existing due to the in 1.4. said definition by a more precise determination by more comparisons. This is possible, for example, whilst this part of the space temporally follows via several sufficient causal chains as described above, in contrast to parts of the space that only temporally follow via a sufficient causal chain. (The fact that in quantum mechanical experiments with the "same" experimental arrangement, among other things, different locations of the same measurement objects are measured or measurement objects are measured sometimes as particles and sometimes as waves, is due, besides the influence of the environment (- see also subchapter 2.1. -), to the staying previous which changes over time, with which there is only an allegedly identical experimental arrangement, the same only in the recognizable arrangement of the current parts of the space, but different in the respective staying previous which has temporally ordered influence according to the respective degree of its existence (- cf. subchapter 1.4 . -).)

Even if not the same reality is described in the macroscopic and in the microscopic point of view, which can not be excluded - also because of the knowledge given in the second chapter -, a deterministic non-local realistic course of time would have to exist for both points of view because of the argumentation given in this subchapter.

The completeness of the space can also be derived from the deterministic time course using the principle of the same right “to be the case” - as in 1.1. described -. The same right "to be the case" is used here as follows: Just as the deterministic time course that exists for us, exists, every other conceivable deterministic time course has the same right to “be the case” as that and must therefore exist. Due to the infinity of the space which has already been shown, the equally existing time courses must possibly exist superimposed and these superimpositions together are the complete space. From this it also follows the definition of time given in the subchapter 1.3. Because if, assumptively, a new space would come into existence with every time unit, this would only be a part of the complete space because the new space would already exist as part of the complete space and would be one with a part of the complete space, also because of the observable time the new space could only exist where the infinite staying complete space already exists. Thus time can only take place within the complete space, which can only be realized by an individual who is a part of the complete space and becomes another part of the complete space.

At this point, the definition of superimpositions in parts of the space and the definition of superimpositions of parts of the space are presented. Superimpositions in parts of the space exist if, in the course of time, deterministically an individual who is a part of the space, becomes at least two parts of the space whereby these at least two parts of the space exist superimposed at at least one location. This means that there exists a location where at least two parts of the space exist which the individual then is. An example of superimpositions in parts of the space can be the given description of a simple superimposition at the end of subchapter 1.1. whereby the associated individual becomes, for example, the wall behind the window in its deterministic course of time and, in addition, superimposed on it, that what is reflected from the room, among other things, at the same location. Superimpositions of parts of the space are given if at least two courses of time which are independent from each other, are different parts of the space at the same location and at the same time whereby the courses of time which are independent from each other, can be part of an individual. Independence here means that the courses of time do not have a common starting point.

The above-mentioned embedding of the “relativity of space and time” in the given description and imagination of space and time results from the fact that every space-time exists as part of the space described in subchapter 1.1. whereby each existing time coordinate can be realized by an associated individual.

In this first chapter the essence of space was worked out; its complement - the spaceless - introduced; a new definition of time justified; the definition of the “existentially higher existence” by introducing the notions “spatial comparison” and “temporal comparison” presented; proved that everything that has existed, stays; discussed that a first time unit exists, and finally shown that the course of time is deterministic.

2. The consciousness that always is

A phenomenon that is still unexplained today is the essence of consciousness which is the focus of this chapter. Intensive research is being carried out on it not only in the neurosciences and psychology, but also in philosophy - especially in the philosophy of mind - but so far without resounding success. This should take place here through a new approach to the problem, via the path of the personal identity.

2.1. What am I?

The main subject of study in philosophy of mind is the mind-body problem which discusses the interaction between the physical and the psychic. There, a distinction is made between dualistic and monistic theories, the former consisting of two mutually exclusive types of substances, the latter of only one (Beckermann 2011). What is presented below is a monistic approach with the substance space; space in different densities, the space densities. In 1.1. it has already been shown that the space is monistic, consisting of different space densities.

A distinction is not made between the notions “mind” and “body”, but the distinction takes place primarily between parts of the space that an individual is and parts of the space that the individual is not. The parts of the space that the individual is, is the soul of the individual of which the mind is a part. The soul exists as a part of the body which the individual in question is not and by which it is surrounded, or the soul exists as an superimposition in the part of the space of which the body is a part. The latter should mean more precisely that the soul exists superimposed in the body whereby it changes its location in space during earthly life (- except for out-of-body experiences and the like, see 3.2. for more -) like the body does. An effect of the body on the soul as well as the reverse effect are here possible and exist if this case applies.

From the law of excluded middle it follows that an individual is either a part of the space or is not this part of the space. The part of the space that the individual is, can - but does not have to - be a coherent part of the space. The fact that the human individual is parts of the space with which the soul of the human individual is parts of the space, follows, inter alia, from the sense of touch, from tactile perception: Because only space and its assumptively existing complement spaceless exist whereby spaceless according to the note from 1.2. cannot exist in space, and we humans perceive some tactilely, but others not, the human individual has to be certain parts of the space, but others not. As an example the following is shown: A raindrop falls on a stone, I don't feel it. A raindrop falls on the palm of my hand, I feel it. But what exactly happens at the tactile perception? The impact of the raindrop on the palm of my hand changes a part of the space that I am: It is compressed which means - strictly speaking - that I become another part of the space with the change which has a higher density.

At the sensory perceptions of feeling, smelling, tasting and hearing, the perceiving individual becomes another part of the space which it is then. It is only different at seeing. The perceived image of the environment - mirrored on one's own retina and measurable in one's own cerebral cortex - is not recognizable to oneself (- see 2.7. for a more detailed discussion of this problem -), but around oneself the environment is recognizable which is also a part of the space. (- Gilbert Harman (* 1938) formulated a similar consideration with his transparency theory, according to which one can see through the states of perception to the external objects (Harman 1990). -) But how can it be explained that the environment around me with its objects is the recognized? There are two possibilities with open eyes.

The first is: It is light and I can recognize an environment around me. The brightness should result from electromagnetic radiation that enters into my eyes. But this does not explain the brightness of the environment around me. It must be explainable by the essence of the space: At a bright environment around me, I have to be part of a part of the space and repeatedly become part of parts of the space over a period of time which primarily consist of space densities with a comparatively low density between objects and me. There, the density, the amount of space, increases with increasing distance from me only to the extent that the objects around me are still recognizable. The further an object moves away from me, the darker it appears to me if, by moving further away, the amount of space between the object and me increases. There, objects are characterized by the fact that they have such a high density that parts of the space - from my point of view - behind them are no longer recognizable. This is because the distant spatial comparison that exists for me there, is a comparison between dark and even darker space densities. This spatial comparison is no longer recognizable to me, also because in comparison to other spatial comparisons that are recognizable to me - such as a light red density compared to a dark blue density -, it does not contain any density difference that is recognizable to me. (- Note: For me as an observer, the becoming-smaller due to an increased distance of an object only results from the distance between the object and me, regardless of how dense the space between the object and me was respectively is because otherwise, a recognized tree in front of me, when it gets dark, i.e. when the amount of space between the tree and me increases, would also have to get smaller at a constant distance between the tree and me, which is not the case in reality. That objects are getting smaller if the distance to them increases, is a conceivable case in the complete space, and in such a case we exist. -)

The second possibility is: It is dark and I can recognize no environment around me. Here, the electromagnetic radiation that enters into my eyes, should be so low that, inter alia, no measurable image is created on the retina. Again, this does not explain the darkness of the environment around me. It must be explainable by the essence of the space, in analogy to the first possibility: At a dark environment around me, I have to be part of a part of the space and repeatedly become part of parts of the space over a period of time which primarily consist of space densities with a comparatively high density between objects and me. There, the density, the amount of space between the objects and me is so high that the objects around me are not recognizable which results from the same argumentation as at the end of the paragraph above before the note. The second possibility largely corresponds to the state with closed eyes, because I am not the outer part of the space of my eyelid which has a high density.

With the help of this second described possibility, the phenomenon why the sun is only recognizable to me after about eight minutes after it has emitted electromagnetic waves, can also be resolved: The electromagnetic waves it emits, change the density of the part of the space towards a lower density, so that the sun becomes recognizable. For example, after seven minutes, the part of the part of the space in front of my eye that reaches up to the electromagnetic waves is still too dense, so that the sun is not yet recognizable for me. Only when the electromagnetic waves have arrived in my eye, more precisely directly in front of the part of space that I am, the entire part of the part of the space between me and the sun consists of a lower density with the result that the sun can be recognized by me. If the visual centers in the brain are removed or if the optic nerve is destroyed, resulting in blindness, the direct environment around the part of the part of the space that I am at my eyes, must also change in such a way that it has a density that is too high and which also is not reduced (sufficiently) by the electromagnetic waves.

The boundary of my being, the boundary of the parts of the space that I am, exists through the existing distance of the environment around me to the parts of the space that I am. For me, the boundary between the parts of the space that I am, is only recognizable if there are sufficiently large differences in density, in color between the parts of the space that I am, and the environment around me. At my arms, for example, there is no recognizability of the environment around me. This can be led back to the fact that my soul has a similar dark space density there as the direct environment around it to which parts of my arms belong. I do not need any organs of perception to be able to recognize the environment around me, the recognizability results from the parts of the space that I am and the resulting boundary to the environment around me. This environment around me is therefore the environment in itself with the objects in themselves.

The fact that the perceived image of the environment in itself is not recognizable (- a more detailed discussion of this is made in 2.7. -) then follows from the fact that an environment exists for me only once and not more than once which has to be the environment in itself around me because it exists with a distance to me and lies outside the parts of the space where I perceive tactilely. This applies not only to me, but also to all people, because they have a physiognomy similar to myself and are certain parts of the space. With this a new epistemological approach was presented, which includes the recognizability of the objects in themselves, of things in themselves. Among other things, this approach opposes idealistic epistemologies that deny the recognizability of things in themselves.

Immanuel Kant would also be wrong in his epistemological considerations. According to him, the recognizable environment around me with its objects, the appearance arises through the effect of an object in itself on my ability to imagine with what the objects in themselves, the things in themselves are not supposed to be around me after him. These should not be recognizable. To refute this assertion, a change of the recognizable environment around me with its objects should be considered: According to Kant, this requires a new further affection which should be independent of the already existing environment around me with its objects, of the already existing appearance (Kant 1974: 69). At his idea, he overlooks the fact that I myself, the parts of the space that I am, have spatial extension due to the note from 1.2., just like the objects in the environment around me. This means that the parts of the space that I am, as well as the objects in the environment around me exist equally to each other, this means, that they both have an influence in their respective being on what will exist after the change (- see 1.7. -). So the objects in the environment around me must be of the same kind as me. Because I am obviously an in-itself-existence and not just an appearance, the objects in the environment around me must also be in-itself-existences, so it has to be an environment around me containing the objects in themselves.

The human being is neither the whole space nor infinitely large parts of the space because a distance (from things in themselves) exists for him and to him. There is also the possibility that people and - in general - individuals overlap, that is, that several individuals can be certain parts of space at the same time, in addition to their disjoint being of the remaining parts that they are respectively. From being certain parts of the space and from the definition of time, it also follows that a changing individual to which human beings also belong, is also time, which exists recognizable for the individual in the form of temporal comparisons.

The recognizability of something more distant described in this subchapter, this means, the recognizability of something that is not adjacent to the parts of the space that a human being is, results from the substance of being which is the empty space, with what - considered differently - only the nothing exists between oneself and the something more distant.

This subchapter can be summarized in the following sentence: I am certain parts of the space, whose boundary is given by the existing distance of the environment around me to these parts of the space with what the environment in itself with its contained things in themselves is recognizable.

2.2. What is a movement?

Let us now come to the description of the movement. According to the in subchapter 1.3. given definition of time, the movement must also be of a discrete nature because the movement is a special form of a change whose discrete nature has already been shown. This view was already shared by Zeno of Elea (490 B.C. - 430 B.C.). For him, a movement consisted of successive states which had an object at different locations (Fränkel 1968). The problem which he overlooked is the following: Which part of the part of the space that completes a change, is the object that was well determined in the part of the space before the change, just whilst the object was a part of this part of the space? This problem also exists due to the fact that the object does neither have to be the most similar part of the part of the space that completes the change, to the part it was before, nor the spatially closest part of the part of the space that completes the change, to the part it was before. This can best be illustrated by looking at oneself:

Do I have to be the part of the temporally following part of the space that is most similar to the part that I was previously in the previous part of the space? Or do I have to be the part of the temporally following part of the space that is spatially closest to the part that I was previously in the previous part of the space? Both questions must be answered in the negative because there is no cause that would answer at least one of these two questions in the affirmative. Another reason for the negation of both questions is that the form of the parts of the space that I am, changes more than just minimally in a time unit and that the spatial positions of the parts of the space that I am, change more than just minimally in a time unit. The former is the case because in the complete space there are still lesser changes of the form of the parts of the space that I am, in a time unit than the changes that the parts of the space that I am, make in a time unit when the body together with the soul grows in the earthly life. The latter is the case because in the complete space there are still lesser changes of the spatial positions of the parts of the space that I am, in a time unit than the changes of the spatial positions of the parts of the space that I am, make in a time unit during the movement of the body in the earthly life. Both are also due to the fact that time is of a discrete nature - time consists of a countably finite or infinite number of time units with a beginning (- cf. 1.6. -) -, but the complete space contains continuums - these continuums consist of an uncountably infinite number of parts -, concerning both the change in form of a part of the space and the change in the spatial position of a part of the space. For example, an assumed minimal change of the spatial position of the parts of the space that I am, has an assumed minimum length between the two spatial positions. This length can, however, be halved again (in the continuum of the complete space) to an even more minimal change of the spatial position, with what the assumed minimal change was not minimal.

Since I neither have to be the spatially closest nor the most similar part of the temporally following part of the space to the part that I was previously in the previous part of the space, there must be another explanation for which part of the part of the space that completes a change, I am because in the reality there is unambiguity about which part of a part of the space that completes a change, I am. (The amount of space that I am, could also change, also because there is no cause why I would have to stay the same amount of space. For the existence of a change in the amount of space of an individual or an object, speaks for example an electron that can be measured at two different locations at the same time in certain experimental arrangements. An electron - considered here as a particle and not as a wave - must have an extension that cannot yet be detected with the existing physical "tools" because electrons interact with the surrounding space and exist in the space in which (- see note from 1.2. -) nothing spaceless can exist.) As said, there has to be another explanation for which part of the part of the space that completes a change, is the previously well determined object, because in the reality there is unambiguity about which part of a part of the space that completes a change, is an object. This existing unambiguity exists not only for objects, but also for souls.

Now the solution to the problem follows: Just as the part of the space of the complete space that follows in time, is selected due to a causal chain of infinitely or finitely many temporally successive parts of the space which is one with the previous causal chain (and the resulting selection of the part of the space of the complete space) and only differs from the previous causal chain in certain spatial and temporal comparisons, the part of the part of the space that wlog an object is after a change, is also selected, determined analogously.

So that is how the selection of the part of the part of the space that the object is after the change, comes about, also because the selection of the part of the part of the space that the object after the change is, is one with the previous selection of the previous part of the previous part of the space that the object was after the previous change, and only differs from the previous selection of the previous part of the previous part of the space that the object was after the previous change, in certain spatial and temporal comparisons. Herewith a description has been provided as a solution that shows how the part of a part of the space that completes a change, is selected, determined which is then wlog an object that was previously a certain part of the previous part of the space. This description applies not only to objects, but also to all other individuals that continue to exist as parts of the part of the space that completes a change.

Consider now the case in which the environment around me has moved just as much as I did myself. (- Because according to 2.1. the environment around me is the environment in itself around me, in the following it is meant with the environment around me the environment in itself around me. -) So the environment around me has as many time units as I do. But now only the environment moves around me, but not myself. Is the movement of the environment around me then recognizable to me, or is it not? It is not because it is in the future for me. Only when I move again and the future occurs for me, the movements of the environment around me which lie in the time of the future that has occurred for me, will be recognizable to me. This fact applies not only to movements of the environment around me, but also generally to changes, such as changes in the space density of unmoved parts of a part of the space that stay at the same location.

Here the problem has now been solved which part of the part of the space that completes a change, is an individual who was well determined in the part of the space before the change from which the existence of movements follows.

2.3. Does co-determination exist?

Based on the findings of the subchapter “What am I?” in which it was shown that individuals are certain parts of the space of the complete space, we will now briefly discuss to what degree an individual determines its being with its changes. The self-determination in which the individual completely determines its being with its changes, exists, among other things, for the individual which is the entire complete space with all its changes. This is the case because of the also existing independence of the assumptively existing spaceless to the complete space (- see subchapter 2.4 for more details -). The complete space thus also forms an enclosed entity. In contrast, there is a co-determination, if an individual who is only a real part of a part of the space, changes in mutual influence with the environment around it. An individual who is only part X of a part of the space A has less co-determination than another individual who is both part X and part Y of the part of the space A. Thus the co-determination of an individual extends to superimpositions in parts of the space and also to superimpositions of parts of the space (- compare definitions in subchapter 1.7. -), if the individual is parts of the latter.

The influence of an individual on the basis of its being of parts of the space does not only have to be of a local nature, which means that not only influence must be exerted on neighboring parts of the space, but with a given non-locality, there is also an influence on parts of the space that are not directly adjacent to the individual. This influence, called entanglement, was presented in 1.7.

The co-determination does not only extend to the environment around the individual, but also to own changes. Among other things, the individual co-determines whether and to what extent their own parts of the space change in their density or form. The degree to which an individual co-determines its own changes or changes in the environment around it, is determined, among other things, by laws of nature. For example, at our laws of nature, I cannot move a stone weighing tons with my own strength, at other laws of nature I possibly can. Laws of nature are apparent regularities of processes in space. Regularities only exist from a macroscopic point of view from which the fine differences that exist on a microscopic point of view, cannot be recognized. The microscopic point of view which also describes the quantum behavior, on the other hand, does not contain any regularities in the changes, but rather apparently probabilistic changes (Feynman 1990). In subchapter 1.7. however, it has been shown that all changes are deterministic in nature. So probabilistic interpretations are based on ignorance arising from the non-consideration of all staying previous of the involved parts of the space (or of the influence of the environment). Thus, the laws of nature, the apparent regularities of processes in the space come from the fact that there are situations that are one with previous situations and only differ from these previous situations in certain spatial and temporal comparisons and thus entail similar - macroscopically seen apparently regular - changes. A situation here is an excerpt from an existentially highest existing part of the space which an individual is, including the relevant excerpts of the previous staying temporal development of this part of the space.

In order to describe the exact origin of the laws of nature, one has to go further. All conceivable time courses in the form of superimpositions of parts of the space are considered for this. These have to exist. This is the case due to the completeness of the space and because there is no cause why only certain time courses should exist; all conceivable time courses have the same right to "be the case” (- see subchapter 1.7. -). The reason for the latter lies in the also existing independence of the assumptively existing spaceless to the complete space. After 1.3. time exists for changing individuals and after 2.2. changing individuals exist only by determinations (which determine which part of the part of the space that completes a change, the individual then is). The result is that time exists by determinations with time containing all conceivable determinations and their temporal courses, so all conceivable time courses. (It should be noted here that time also exists for the individuals which observe the time in the environment around them, but which are assumptively not changing whereby the concerned individuals must exist in the future for the time they are observing.) These determinations which make time existing, also set the laws of nature at the same time with their existence because other determinations also make other laws of nature. From the fathomed that time exists by determinations, it can be deduced that there are no additional “own” effects of space densities. This is the case because all conceivable determininations already include all conceivable effects. The part of the space occuring at the new time unit is not composed with and with over several time units from single determinations, but the determinations which part of the newly occuring part of the space each single individual is at the new time unit, come into existence at the same time with what this corresponds to an overall effect on all involved space densities.

Thus the existence of the co-determination of individuals was demonstrated with the help of their demarcation from self-determination. There the essence and existence of the laws of nature on which the co-determination of individuals depends, were described.

2.4. What is the will?

Now not only the question arises to what extent the parts of a part of the space that an individual is, form a will, but also the fundamental question what a will actually is. A will consists of spatial and possibly temporal parts that intend or intended something that can already exist, be it in the staying previous or also as part of the current part of the space, or that has not occurred; or that should occur in the future. A spaceless will is composed of - if it exists - spaceless parts with possibly spaceless time and the resulting temporal comparisons that also intend or intended something in the staying spaceless previous, in the belonging spaceless present or in the spaceless future. Should the situation arise, combinations of a will and a spaceless will exist as well. The reason that the will respectively the spaceless will or combinations of both consist of the named is that only this exists. For example, I intend to pick up a glass to drink from. My hand as well as the glass consist of spatial parts of a part of the space whereby an imagination that is recognizable to me and that includes time, can also exist which has the take-the-glass-in-the-hand as its content.

An imagination is something that is placed in front of oneself which means that in front of oneself, in front of one´s body or in the head of oneself in front of the soul, there exists a superimposition, i.e. two spatial parts are at one location. The author cannot say conclusively whether imaginations must be superimpositions in parts of the space or whether they can also be superimpositions of parts of the space (- cf. definitions in 1.7. -). The same applies to optical hallucinations. Why my imaginations and optical hallucinations that I might have, are not recognizable for my fellow human beings is explained in subchapter 2.7.

On the question to what extent the parts of a part of the space that an individual is, form a will, the following can be answered: If it is an individual that is not the whole part of the space, then the parts of the part of the space that the individual is, can be a complete will or just parts of a will. What all wills have in common is that they intend, want something at a certain location in a certain way. What this is, depends on the respective will. In the following, three types of will are presented in order to display the nature of will more concretely.

The will which includes everything staying previous and the entire part of the space that exists existentially the highest, only wants something without contradiction and is composed of the single existing space densities, is realized because the time course is deterministic and exactly that occurs what is wanted. There, what is willed differs from that what occurs insofar as what is willed only contains that what occurs in an indirectly determined manner. As an example, to make this indirect determination clearer, use the following: A blue cuboid is adjacent to a green cuboid, both of the same size and spatially more precisely determined by the rest of the environment around them. The blue cuboid wants to change its location to the new time unit so that it will exist at the location of the green cuboid. In this case, the indirect determination of the will from the perspective of the blue cuboid is: I want me to be there - at the current location of the green cuboid - so - in my current constitution -.

Wills that have certain objects comprising several space densities, which are more precisely determined by the environment around them, are realized or not. This depends on what is wanted with the object in question. If it is something without contradiction, the realization takes place, otherwise not. Take as an example a will that has as objects a sequence of imaginations. Let us consider again the above wanting-to-take-the-glass-in-hand. As a sequence of imaginations, the superimpositions in or of the temporally successive parts of the space exist which have as content how I take the glass in my hand. Whether I will take the “tangible” glass that has mass and is in front of me, in the following time units in my hand, will either become existing or not. This depends, among other things, on the staying previous. There is also an indirect determination here, because the sequence of imaginations “how I take the glass in my hand” is supposed to exist at the location where the “tangible” glass that has mass, is located.

Another type of a will is the will that is set in hindsight. In this case, the imagination that makes up the main part of this will, only arises after the time unit after which the will that is set in hindsight, should have existed realized. There is also an indirect determination to be found through the wanted location, a minor part of this will.

Let us now come to the idea of a free will: Is the free will completely impossible due to the determinism, due to the prevailing deterministic course of time, or does there a certain freedom exist? Consider for that the equal randomness as in 1.7. This equal randomness is neither determined by the staying previous, nor is it dependent on an environment around it, also because, regarding the latter, every conceivable environment comes into existence after the time unit through the equal randomness; it can thus be assigned the property of freedom. Thus all time-encompassing individuals have at least partially a free will because they contain equal randomnesses due to their first time unit and a part of the cause - among other things at the equal randomnesses - can be set as the will. Also to be considered is the individual who has a first time unit, but exists in a deterministic course of time which already existed at least several time units before, before the first time unit of this individual, with which a sufficient causal chain for the selection of the following part of the space which this individual is after the change, exists in this deterministic course of time (- compare with 1.7. and 2.2. -). For this individual then exists for the part of the space that it was at the beginning, - considered alone - an equal randomness and thus for this individual exists partially a free will. Furthermore, an individual who has a beginning in time and has no environment around him and does not exist in a deterministic course of time which already existed at least several time units before the first time unit of this individual, thus has an originally completely free will which after the second time unit (- cf. 1.7. -) proceeds determined due to a then existing sufficient causal chain. Furthermore, the case has to be considered that at an existing environment around a part of the space which is a starting individual assumptively, the equal randomness also exists for this environment with which this individual would originally also be completely free. Because every environment would be selected as the environment after the first time unit and that for every part of the space that the individual would be after its first time unit due to the equal randomness.

After it could be clarified to what extent a free will exists in individuals that encompass time, the much-mentioned investigation of the independence of the assumptively existing spaceless to the complete space now follows. Here, no third entity can exist because according to the law of excluded middle something has spatial extension or it is not the case that something has spatial extension, what would be spaceless. Two entities are independent of each other if neither one influences the other nor does the other influence the one. An influence in space happens over time and needs a will because every change which also includes influence in space, requires a will since the cause which precedes every change, is at the same time also will; a will which, by definition, intends something at a location in a certain way (- or, in the case of spaceless, intends something in a certain way after the time unit in question -).

An effect, an influence in the form of discrete changes from the spaceless on the spatial, something that has spatial extension, does not exist in the respect in which the spatial is considered alone. The existence of this respect follows from the existence of a first time unit since a first time unit lets arise all conceivable cases which also include the case, the respect of the sole consideration of the spatial.

The fact that this respect of the sole consideration of the spatial exists also follows from the fact that not only spaceless can have existed at the beginning of one's own existence. This is the case because, if assumptively only spaceless would have existed at the beginning of one's existence, always via the will "being-unequal-spaceless willed after the change" which is equivalent to the will "being-parts-of-the-space willed after the change", the equal randomness would have occurred and at each following time unit numerous superimpositions of the entire complete space would always have to exist evenly existentially the highest, which is not the case. Evenly means here, among other things, that existentially the highest symmetry should exist, also at the numerous superimpositions, which is not always the case in reality. The unambiguity and unevenness that occurs at the existentially highest existing part of the space has become existent due to the in 1.4. stated definition by a more precise determination by more comparisons. This is possible, for example, whilst this part of the space temporally follows via more sufficient causal chains as described in 1.7., in contrast to parts of the space that temporally follow via less sufficient causal chains.

In summary, one can also speak of an independence of the spaceless to the complete space. This independence exists because of the existing sole consideration of the spatial. And should this alone considered spatial become also spaceless via the will "being-unequal-spatially-extended willed after the change" existing from another respect which is equivalent to the will "being-spaceless willed after the change" - besides the further only spatial deterministic course of time -, then the respect would again exist at which this further only spatial deterministic course of time would continue to progress in time alone without the influence of the spaceless. (The respects at which the added spaceless would influence the spatial deterministic course of time, e.g. via entanglements (- these are not entanglements in a part of the space, but entanglements between different deterministic courses of time, assuming the existence of a spaceless deterministic course of time (- see 2.7. for more -) -), would then exist in parallel. These respects are irrelevant for understanding the essence of consciousness, which is finally presented in 2.7., as well as for the proof of the endless consciousness.)

Herewith the essence of the will was expounded, in particular also by the fact what all wills have in common, namely that they want something at a certain location in a certain way whereby the essence of the imagination was explained. Following this, various types of will were described in more detail, the idea of a free will was partly affirmed, and the independence from assumptively existing spaceless to the complete space was discussed.

2.5. Does a certainty about the future exist?

On the basis of the will that includes everything staying previous and the entire part of the space that exists existentially the highest, only wants something without contradiction and is composed of the single existing space densities and is therefore realized as wanted whereby the realization and the will differ in that what is wanted, contains the realized only indirectly determined, the notion of certainty about the future is introduced. This will shows a similarity with the Laplace´s demon. The latter has full knowledge of the current being of the universe and of all the forces that prevail there with what every past and future state is determined and thus known (Höfling 1994). The differences between the said will and the Laplace´s demon lie mainly in the following: On the one hand in the staying previous which the Laplace´s demon does not contain, and on the other hand in the in 1.1. given new description of the space which includes the universe as a real finite subset. Thus the Laplace´s demon which only encompasses our universe, cannot have knowledge of the future state of our universe. The certainty about the future is therefore the in the said will indirectly determined contained realized; so this certainty also exists. However, this certainty does not exist existentially the highest because the staying previous is included which does not exist existentially the highest, and because this certainty cannot exist without this and because the whole only exists existentially as high as the existentially lowest component of it. An uncertainty about the future can therefore be found at all heights of existence that exist not existentially the lowest. It also follows from this the definition of the height of existence analogous to the definition of existentially-higher-existent from 1.4.: A height of existence is characterized by the comparisons it contains, and differs from another in the number of these.

It should be emphasized that not only the certainty about the next future, about the next time unit exists indirectly determined, but also the certainty about the whole future, about the whole future time units exists indirectly determined. This is the case because the certainty about the next time unit contains indirectly determined this next time unit from what without delay the next but one time unit and all following time units can be derived indirectly determined and thus exist indirectly determined. There, existing entanglements are just as relevant as superimpositions in a part of the space and superimpositions of parts of the space. The relevance of superimpositions of parts of the space for the certainty about the future results from the fact that there are also cases - in addition to cases in which the superimpositions of parts of the space are independent from each other - in which these have an influence on each other. There are thus time-encompassing individuals who have existentially not the highest sure knowledge about their entire future.

As an objection to a certainty about the future, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle must be presented. According to this, two complementary properties of a particle, i.e. of a space density or of a “small” part of the space, cannot be determined at the same time arbitrarily precisely, especially not the pair of properties position and momentum (Grebe-Ellis / Passon 2015). However, because both the exact determination of the position and of the momentum are necessary for the certainty about the future (of the particle), this certainty may therefore not exist.

The justification for this objection is as follows: The certainty about the future and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle are not mutually exclusive. This will now be shown. Consider the Heisenberg's uncertainty principle for position and momentum. There, the position of a particle is determined arbitrarily precisely with the help of a measurement, so that at the same time the momentum can only be determined out of focus with the help of further measurements. How is the momentum now supposed to still exist arbitrarily precisely determined which is part of the certainty about the future? This precise determination does not exist by measurement, but with the help of the in 1.5. shown staying previous and the in 1.7. shown deterministic course of time, so for an individual which is the staying previous and the deterministic course of time (- see for this also subchapter 3.1. -). Due to the staying previous, all positions of the particle exist arbitrarily precisely determined, also due to the discrete nature of time. These positions change discretely deterministically and together with the environment around them form the exact momentum of the particle. So the whole future momentum of the particle can also in turn be determined because this exists as part of the in the initially said will indirectly determined contained realized. Thus, on the one hand, there is certainty about the future for the said individual - it is also identical to the will mentioned at the beginning – and, on the other hand, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle remains valid, not only for location and momentum, but for every complementary pair of properties.

The most important finding of this subchapter is that individuals encompassing time exist that have a certainty about their entire future, even if this only exists existentially not the highest. This finding was able to withstand the objection of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. But what use is this knowledge? Does it contribute to the happiness of the individuals in question?

2.6. What is happiness?

In order to answer the last question mentioned in the previous subchapter, we first need to discuss the essence of happiness. Happiness is tied to wills because nothing is per se good or bad in the complete space. Good means that it contributes to happiness, bad means the opposite. So happiness is an overweight of good over bad, unhappiness an underweight of good over bad. Hence, absolute happiness is if there is only good. Good is something - a thought, an action or something experienced - if the underlying will is realized; bad is something if the underlying will is not realized. This follows inductively from experience: Just as a certain will is realized and this is perceived as good, so this applies to all realized wills because all these wills including their realization are located in space and time and are one with each other and only differ from each other in certain spatial and temporal components. They are isomorphic to each other. So good is something subjective. If, for example, I want to solve a mathematical equation using imaginations and I succeed, then this is good and at the same time a good feeling. The good and the good feeling are identical here, both include the will and the realization. It should be emphasized that all feelings known to us only consist of spatial and temporal components. To illustrate the latter, consider the above example again. My good feeling which is my solving of the mathematical equation, can possibly be expanded to an even greater good feeling if, for example, a hormone release follows the solution of the equation. Such a hormone release changes my physical state wlog in a state of increased attention through an increased blood flow of my brain interacting with the soul with the result of an increase of the good feeling (Mayer 2015) because another will is realized by it, namely the one who intends to want to survive which is more guaranteed with increased attention than otherwise. Also health is not good per se either because if it were, it would be a good feeling for a life weary, which it is not; the life weary does not want health, health is bad, a bad feeling for him.

This can now answer the said question: To have the certainty about the own whole future existentially not the highest only contributes to happiness if this knowledge is wanted. This can be the case existentially the highest or existentially not the highest. More important than this question is the following: Does an individual keep getting happier? In order for this to be true, with the progressing time, the new wills that have been realized, must always outweigh the new wills that have not been realized, in the sum of the heights of existence of these new single wills including their realization or non-realization whereby the height of existence of an wlog realized will is given by its existentially lowest component. It can therefore also be that there are more new wills realized than there are new wills not realized, and still the individual encompassing these wills does not become happier.

At the following two types of wills, the wills in question are realized of which only one certainly exists. The uncertain type of will which at most rarely exists through determinism, is that in which existentially the highest that is wanted in the form of an indirect determination, what will exist in the following time unit or in one of the following. The other type of will consists of the wills, each of which includes everything staying previous and the entire part of the space that exists existentially the highest, only wants something without contradiction and is composed of the single existing space densities and is always realized. This will was shown in 2.4. for the first time and initially in 2.5. repeated.

Because there are infinitely many different wills due to the staying previous and the equal randomness, of which at most the existentially highest wills are recognizable for one, the knowledge whether the associated individual has become or is becoming happier, does not exist existentially the highest, just as it is also the case with the certainty about the future. In the existing given there are only now and then existentially highest existing wills whereby only now and then feelings exist existentially the highest. The existing given is what is at the moment, in the last few existentially highest time units “there”.

The last treatise of this subchapter deals with the pursuit of happiness which is of a principled nature in space and time, as well as in assumptively existing spaceless and assumptively existing associated spaceless time. The pursuit of happiness means wanting happiness. The opposite pursuit of unhappiness can never be realized. This is the case because if wlog I want unhappiness and therefore a will should not be realized and this also occurs, the will including the realization would at the same time be a bad feeling due to its non-realization and not a bad feeling, a good feeling because it would correspond to the will “wanting unhappiness”. Even if these are different respects, “wanting unhappiness” can never be realized because both respects always exist at the same time. Otherwise, if I want unhappiness, but a will is realized, then the realized will would be a good feeling with what on the one hand I would have a good feeling because of the realized will, but on the other hand I would at the same time have a bad feeling because of the wanted unhappiness. Here, too, these are different respects. “Wanting unhappiness” can never be realized here either because both respects always exist at the same time.

A pursuit of happiness, however, is realizable and is therefore existing in everything that is capable of will because there wills should be realized and an occurrence of them is a good feeling in two respects: firstly by the realized will and secondly by the contribution of the realized will to the wanted happiness. If an occurrence of will does not exist, then there is a bad feeling in two respects: firstly by the not realized will and secondly by the non-contributing of the not realized will to the wanted happiness. The fact that happiness is also wanted in everything capable of will, results from the fact that with the will that should be realized, the superordinate will also exists indirectly determined, that wants further wills to be realized in the future, analogous to the willed. The superordinate will that wants wills not to be realized in the future which corresponds to “wanting unhappiness”, also exists indirectly determined, but this will cannot be realized.

The trains of thought regarding the pursuit of happiness can be applied isomorphically to the assumptively existing spaceless and to the assumptively existing associated spaceless time.

After the brief discussion about the essence of happiness, it could not be given a general affirmative to the question whether an individual is keep getting happier, although there may be individuals at whom, with progressing time, the new wills that have been realized, always outweigh the new wills that have not been realized, in the sum of the heights of existence of these new single wills including their realization or non-realization. However, it could be shown that individuals can only strive for happiness. The question that now arises is, whether one can attain a happier life through a moral life? Are more wills from oneself or at least from the environment around oneself realized through moral deeds than with the opposite?

Exkursus: What should I do?

We thus take up the topic of “ethics” which includes the notion of morality and deals with the prerequisites for human action and its valuation (Anzenbacher 2003). Morality is the matching of thought and action with the moral law, a term coined by Immanuel Kant, which is an objective law that should oblige people to comply (Korff 1985: 113f.). However, this is based on a free will, which brings us to the problem: Moral action requires a free will as a prerequisite because without a free will moral action is impossible (Hüntelmann 2017). In 2.4. we have seen that all time-encompassing individuals possess at least partial a free will, some of them are even originally entirely free. However, freedom only initially exists in the case of equal randomnesses which then proceed in a determined manner after their second time unit due to a sufficient causal chain that then exists. However, since the initial freedom exists there only in the fact that there is neither a determinism from staying previous, nor a dependency on an environment around one, but not otherwise, and the equal randomness exists as a temporal succession, the will is not be chosen self-determined or co-determined from a set of wills, but all conceivable wills occur initially. This means that the wills themselves as well as actions that may later follow from single wills, can be assessed as moral, but the person in question had no choice to want or act morally or immorally, also because it was impossible for him in each case to want or act differently. Because of this, not only do all deontological ethics fall away as useless, but also all teleological ethics at which an aim is strived for that can be comprehensively regarded as good (- cf. 2.6. -).

Nevertheless, the author is willing, as a result of the determinism that includes him, to present ethical trains of thought, with the intention that thereby good thoughts and actions will become existing at the reader and at the environment around him. This is done for selfish motives. Every human being - including the author -, but also all other individuals cannot want something selflessly because every will which can also encompass the environment around the wlog human being, originates from the human being and is part of its pursuit of happiness. However, as long as existentially the highest the will exists that the human being belonging to the will wants to live in the earthly (- The will to live, to live on physically exists mostly - but not always, for example not, if only a tree exists existentially the highest in front of one and nothing of the body - existentially the highest through the existentially the highest existing living body which is also in the following part of the space willed through the existentially the highest existing will "the previous living physically existentially the highest continued existence in the following part of the space wanted as before". -), the will of the human being should include the happiness of other people whereby these also have to want to live existentially the highest in the earthly. This is the case because the human being as a living being can hardly survive alone in the earthly. He needs the other for it. Due to the variety of talents of the single human beings and their supported realization, he can survive more securely in the earthly, realize his will in this regard. At the same time he should and wants to realize its talents and thus contribute to the continued existence of other people in order to indirectly guarantee its survival in the earthly. The human being also wants the continuation of nature and the living beings integrated there because the human being needs nature just like its fellow human beings to survive.

This brings us to a modified categorical imperative. Originally this categorical imperative formulated by Kant reads as follows: “Act only according to the maxim by which you can at the same time want it to become a general law” (Kant 1999: 45). Due to the also existing independence of the assumptively existing spaceless to the complete space (- cf. 2.4. -) and because reason also consists only of spatial and temporal components (- see the following subchapter -), the categorical imperative formulated by Kant must be thought completely in space and time. It can still be used as a basis since it intends the happiness of all human beings in a certain way to what Kant probably also intended their survival on earth which in turn is essential for the selfish motive of one's own survival. But without an explicit addition that the survival of everyone on earth should be guaranteed, points of criticism arise - some of them are presented in the following - and make a modification necessary. This modification therefore includes a teleological addition whereby, however, the duty of this modified imperative only conditionally exists and is thus diminished and the categorical imperative becomes a hypothetical imperative according to Kant - since it leads to an aim (Kant 1983: 65f.): "Act only according to the maxim by which you can at the same time want it to become a general law whereby this guarantees the survival of everyone, especially the own, more than if the general law is not complied." This addition contains a selfish moment, namely that of choosing the maxim for action in such a way that one's own survival is primarily secured which leads to a conflict with the second fundamental striving on earth - besides striving for one's own survival -, the striving for conservation of the species (Freud 2013), for example at the will not to sacrifice one's own life for that of one's own children who in the constructed case would not survive without sacrificing one's own life. In this constructed case, one's own survival would be preferable to that of one's own children according to the modified thereby hypothetical imperative which means that overall the striving of one's own survival is preferable to the striving for conservation of the species. (It should be noted that the striving of one's own survival can also be viewed as falling under the striving for conservation of the species since the one who strives for its own survival, is part of the species to be preserved and thus its striving of its own survival is part of the striving for conservation of the species. Due to the previous considerations, according to which one's own survival is preferable to that of the other, the differentiation between the two fundamental strivings on earth remains justified.)

Furthermore, this addition ensures that the problem recognized by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 - 1831) that the original categorical imperative can justify the existence and the non-existence of property without contradictions, but should prove the necessity of property (Hegel 2012: 463), is dissolved towards the existence of property to an reasonable extent since this addition contradicts an accumulation of property at the expense of fellow human beings: after securing one's own existence through property, the securing of the existence of the fellow human beings through property follows immediately before accumulation of further one´s own possessions. However, common sense is still required in order to prevent incorrect interpretations.

Due to the fact that the thought precedes the action, even if the thought is existentially not the highest, a more appropriate formulation of the modified thereby hypothetical imperative would be the following: “Think and act only according to the maxim by which you can at the same time want it to become a general law whereby this guarantees the survival of everyone, especially the own, more than if the general law is not complied." This formulation is more appropriate with regard to the pursuit of happiness since bad thoughts of a human being willing to live and the resulting bad feelings do not occur through its realization. This formulation can be shortened to the following: "Think in such a way that the survival of everyone, especially the own, is ensured." This reduction is correct because on the one hand - as already mentioned - every action must be preceded by a thought whereby this thought at best should exist existentially the highest at the human being in question. On the other hand, securing the survival of everyone, especially the own, contains all the wanted general laws of those who want to live, which arise from the maxims in question. The latter want, directly or indirectly, the survival of everyone, especially the own.

The striving for conservation of the species does not contradict the aiming of the general laws at the survival because the survival of all is more ensured through the realization of the striving for conservation of the species than otherwise: the older generations need younger generations for further temporary survival on earth. Technological progress should be noted here which could mean that in the future older generations would no longer need younger generations for further temporary survival. Then the now hypothetical imperative in the abridged modified version presented here would no longer include the will to strive for conservation of the species, but this will to strive for conservation of the species would not contradict this version since the survival would be a necessary prerequisite for the realization of the said will. This hypothetical imperative would thus be a necessary prerequisite for the becoming-happier on earth for those who want to live, after what it can only be striven for (- cf. 2.6. -). This hypothetical imperative is also a necessary prerequisite for the wills of those who want to live, which do not result from the will to survive, but have arisen in the deterministic course of time.

This hypothetical imperative is not "Think in such a way that everyone's happiness, especially the own, is increased." since that what makes one happier, is subjective nature, especially the wills of those who want to live, which do not result from the will, wanting to survive, but rather have arisen in the deterministic course of time. What all those who want to live, have in common, however, is the will to survive which can itself be formulated as a maxim and also includes other maxims. In conclusion, it can be said that this hypothetical imperative does not apply to all wills, but is a necessary prerequisite for all wills of those who want to live.

A closer look reveals that the "ought" corresponds to the will of those who want to live (,except for the wills of those who want to live, which do not result from the will to survive, but have arisen in the deterministic course of time and only have this hypothetical imperative as a necessary prerequisite for the becoming-happier): The one who wants to live, wants exactly what he should think and do, namely to strive for the survival of all, especially his own. For this reason, the striving for the realization of this hypothetical imperative lies in the essence of the one who wants to live. The privation of the will to live, however, exists in some human beings, created through their own thoughts or through the environment around them which includes genetic causes and aging. It is the task of the environment around these human beings to give them a will to live because this then contributes to the advancement of the happiness of all and to avoid a conflict of interests between those who are willing to live, and those who are weary of life.

Due to the fact that the "ought" corresponds to the will of those who want to live, an ideal realm of values which according to their preachers like Plato (428/427 B.C. - 348/347 B.C.) should not exist in space, is not mandatory. A value should here also be something mental, which should be the realization of a mental will (Hessen 1948). As we have already partially seen and will see later, all of our mental wills together with the mind itself which can be defined as a part of the soul, exist in space and time. This results in the impossibility of the existence of an ideal realm of values which should not exist in space, but could only exist there what contradicts itself.

Looking at the principle of reciprocity “Like you to me, so I to you!” from the perspective of the hypothetical imperative “Think so that the survival of everyone, especially the own, is ensured”, the question arises as to whether this principle is still acceptable. If this hypothetical imperative is followed by the action of the other and by my action in response, then it is acceptable. But if the action of the other does not comply with this, then this principle is not acceptable. In this case it should read: "Like I to you, so hopefully you also to me!" So I have to lead by example and think and act in such a way that the survival of everyone, especially my own, is ensured, regardless of previous actions that might have happened to me, in the hope that my counterpart will follow my example. The principle of reciprocity can thus be preserved, but only in the formulation "Like I to you, so hopefully you also to me!", since this formulation can also be used in the first case.

Finally, we return to the transitional questions of the previous subchapter whether a happier life can be achieved through a moral life and whether more wills can be realized by oneself or at least by the environment around oneself through moral deeds than with the opposite. Since it is impossible to will or act otherwise than as this is the case, there is no choice to live more morally than as this is the case. Comparisons as to whether a human being has become happier exist for it only by comparisons to the staying previous, for example to the percentage of wills realized there. Nevertheless, the author asks the reader because of the determinism that includes him, to think in such a way that the survival of all, especially the own, will be ensured, and to lead by example in the hope that the counterpart in the determinism that includes him, will follow this example.

2.7. Does consciousness always exist?

After certain parts of consciousness have already been discussed, including the personal identity in 2.1. and 2.2., or the will in 2.4., we now come to consciousness and the polarizing assertion that the consciousness of an individual exists permanently since the beginning of its existence with what it would not arise and would also not have an interruption, but only certain changes.

For this, the essence of consciousness must first be clarified: What is consciousness? In the example in subchapter 1.5. it was said that consciousness is, if at least something spatially extended exists for one - in the following: for me. The existence of something spatially extended for me usually contains the two most important characteristics of consciousness: the recognizability of the environment around me and a knowledge of myself (Damasio 2013). Both are given by the existing distance of parts of the space to the part of the space that I am myself. If, on the other hand, such a distance is not recognizable, for example with closed eyes, these two characteristics of consciousness coincide to form the necessary and sufficient characteristic, the existence of something spatially extended for me. This is necessary because without the existence of something spatially extended for me, only something spaceless could exist for me. But this contradicts the reality in which everything that exists for me, is based on something spatially extended. For example, this is the case with auditory perception. This leads to the assertion: everything that exists for me, consists of parts of the space and possibly temporal, be it time or temporal comparisons. This means that all my thoughts, wills and feelings only consist of parts of the space and possibly temporal. This was made clear in the subchapters 2.4. and 2.6., and follows from that assumptively existing spaceless and the assumptively existing associated spaceless time in this regard exist also independently of space and temporal. This independence and the application example from 1.5. what also lets my thoughts, my will, my feelings and the corresponding extend on the staying comparatively existentially not the highest existing previous, finally show the assertion that everything that exists for me, consists of parts of the space and possibly temporal. (This also means that an ideal sphere with its logical laws (Hessen 1947) is set in one with the real sphere and its ontological laws. But how then do some philosophers falsely come to the assumption of the existence of an ideal sphere? The reason for this lies in the lack of repatriation of what is ideal to them to the real for which the everything-stays-proof is necessary which was still unknown to them. For example, the logical law of thought of the law of non-contradiction is based on a staying existentially not the highest existing wlog imagination, and imaginations are - as described in 2.4. - superimpositions in a part of the space or superimpositions of parts of the space, so imaginations are parts of the real sphere. Another sphere which is also independent to the real sphere, could only be that of the assumptively existing spaceless in which the ontological laws of the real sphere would apply analogously.)

So it remains to show that the existence of something spatially extended for me is sufficient for the existence of consciousness. The proof results from the following: on the one hand, the assumptively existing spaceless and the assumptively existing associated spaceless time exist according to 2.4. in this regard also independently of space and temporal. On the other hand, a spatially extended existing for me changes over time only in the increase of the staying previous and in the part of the space that I am, or in the parts of the space that are the recognizable and the not recognizable environment around me which is why a spatially extended existing for me has just such a consciousness as any change of it. This last conclusion becomes clearer under the aspect that all spatial and temporal comparisons and the more precise determinations through them are comparable to each other, nothing unsuitable to each other exists in space and temporal. And that a change of something spatially extended for me has a consciousness, results for me from my current time-encompassing consciousness which is present while studying this text.

From the proof that the existence of something spatially extended for me is sufficient for the existence of a consciousness, it inevitably follows with 2.2. and the knowledge there that an individual who was well determined in the part of the space before a change, also exists determined as a part of the part of the space that completes the change, that consciousness must exist permanently and without interruption. But how does that fit with reality in which the belief is widespread that there are also times in which there should be no consciousness? It must be a misbelief. If I think I was without consciousness at a time, then I have either a false or an incomplete memory. (Here, the essence of memories has to be dealt with in more detail. A memory needs two components: on the one hand, the current part of the space which is the starting point of the memory, and, on the other hand, staying previous parts of the space that contain what is remembered. The connection between the two exists via similar arrangements of the parts of the space.) If I mean I have no consciousness in the current time unit, then the consciousness often lies in that I am conscious of the fact that I allegedly have no consciousness. In order to notice the alleged absence of my consciousness, I need a certain form of consciousness.

Easier than by the way that the existence of something spatially extended for me is sufficient for the existence of consciousness, the permanence of consciousness can be shown via the everything-stays-proof and the everyday example there: An existing consciousness must remain as part of the new time unit and all following time units due to the everything-stays-proof and will remain so existentially the highest in these following time units, if I assumptively do not have a new consciousness existentially higher. So a consciousness exists permanently and without interruption, either the staying one or a new existentially higher one, which includes the staying previous one. This also showed the existence of the eternal consciousness. (“Eternal” here means that, regardless of whether new time units occur or not, something, here the consciousness, exists forever. “Eternal” is to be distinguished from “endless” since new time units must always occur for something endless.)

It is also clear with subchapter 1.6. in which it was shown that I must have a first time unit, that before my first time unit I already have consciousness in my then still timeless but spatially extended being of a part of the space because something spatially extended existing for me exists, even if only spatially, which then begins to change and which is sufficient according to the above for the existence of a consciousness. It follows in turn that my consciousness does not arise in the course of my existence; it only changes.

The existing order of consciousness exists through the spatial and temporal comparisons. Through the spatial comparisons there is an order of the forms and colors according to the similarity, e.g. “red” is more similar to “bright red” than to “blue” because at “red” the amount of space of a certain extent is more similar to another amount of space of a different certain extent which is "bright red", than to that which is "blue". The order in time exists through the comparisons of causal chains to each other which are one with each other and only differ from each other in certain spatial and temporal comparisons (- compare 1.7. -). So there is always a certain order of consciousness which is why order is not a criterion for the existence of consciousness.

Thus the following sentence can be deduced: the current consciousness of an individual exists through the finitely long-lasting changes of the parts of the space that the individual is, and through the finitely long-lasting changes of the parts of the space around it, including all contained staying spatial and temporal comparisons. (This means that the term “conscious” can now be used synonymously with the term “existentially the highest”.)

Let us now take a closer look at a part of the parts of the space that I am, namely the part of the space from where my gaze starts. This is the part of these parts of the space from which the distance to the recognizable environment around me starts. This part of the space from where my gaze starts, cannot be spaceless, i.e. it cannot be a spaceless “starting point” from where my gaze starts since this is in the space and according to the note from 1.2. something spaceless cannot lie in the space, cannot exist in the space. Further this part of the space from where my gaze starts, must have changed so much in the course of its finitely long existence, must have as many time units as the existentially highest recognizable environment in front of it because otherwise this environment in front of it would lie in the future for the part of the space from where my gaze starts, and so would not be recognizable yet. A question that arises here - also due to 2.1. - is why the mirrored image of the environment in front of this part of the space from where my gaze starts, on the retina in my head (Schmidt 2005) (which I am not because otherwise I would have to be it existentially the highest, but this is not the case) is not part of the recognized environment in front of this part of the space from where my gaze starts, so in front of me, which is recognizable for the observer by measurement.

An answer in case that the observer speaks the truth regarding his observation of the image on my retina (- in the case that the observer speaks an untruth and he does not observe an image on my retina, the following answer may not be necessary -), resorts to a certain form of entanglement: The observer and I consciously exist in two different deterministic courses of time which are, however, entangled with each other. These are not entanglements in a part of the space, as in 1.7. described, but an entanglement between two different deterministic courses of time, between two different deterministic time developments. The coming about and the essence of this entanglement will now be described, also because there is not only this entanglement between two different deterministic courses of time in the whole complete space with its deterministic courses of time, but every conceivable one since they belong to everything conceivable in the whole complete space (- cf. 1.3. -).

Such an entanglement between two different deterministic courses of time can come about because the part of the space that the observer is, exists in both deterministic courses of time and forms an entanglement between the two deterministic courses of time. The entanglement now lies in the following: This part of the space is determined in the observer's conscious deterministic course of time by more comparisons than the same in my conscious deterministic course of time and thus determines the changes of itself in my conscious deterministic course of time through the existing entanglement in such a way that these changes are one with those in his conscious deterministic course of time and proceed according to the will in his conscious deterministic course of time. These changes cause, among other things, the statement in my conscious deterministic course of time that the observer has recognized an image on my retina in his conscious deterministic course of time by measurement.

This answer also applies to everything that the observer recognizes but I do not, e.g. to imaginations or visual hallucinations in front of him and from him.

In a way, the foregoing is a panpsychism. In such a case everything that exists, has a soul (Chalmers 2013). As an objection, the combination problem is raised. The problem there is, among other things, how the microscopic view of the reality, consisting of simple basic building blocks, should form the macroscopic view of the reality with its high complexity. A solution to this problem must exist since the foregoing which is panpsychistic in nature, has only been analytically inferred from the existing extension of the being and its existing changes. A proposed solution is as follows: since an observer can never have the microscopic view and the macroscopic view of something at the same time and in the same respect, nor can he have an wlog microscopic view of something of which another observer has a macroscopic view at the same time (since they exist in two different deterministic courses of time), the microscopic view need not be of the same as the macroscopic view; it may have changed (significantly) over the (short) period of time. And the fact that only simple basic building blocks are observed experimentally and not the abundance of existing space densities of the entire complete space is possibly due to the experiments which up until now have only ever let a part of the space follow consciously in time which consists of "the simple basic building blocks", among other things.

The existing complexity of consciousness; of a consciousness that has as a necessary and sufficient characteristic the existence of something spatially extended for the individual in question and that through the finitely long-lasting changes of the parts of the space that the individual is, and through the finitely long-lasting changes of the parts of the space around it, including all contained staying spatial and temporal comparisons exists permanently; was also expressed in this concluding subchapter by analyzing the example with the statement "You have an image of your environment on your retina."

In this second chapter the personal identity was analyzed with the result that the thing in itself is recognizable; the essence of movement fundamentally considered; the will, together with the discussion of the also existing independence of the assumptively existing spaceless to the complete space fathomed; and the permanent existence of consciousness with its inevitable pursuit of happiness proven.

3. The endless consciousness

Near-death experiences are reported in almost all cultures (Brauner 2005). They point to an existing consciousness even after death. In this final chapter, its endlessness is proven. For that, the existence of a certain pantheistic God is first shown and whether this God can have an influence on the consciousness of individuals.

3.1. What is God?

The most common ideas about God are of theistic, deistic, or pantheistic nature. Both theism and deism are based on a God who is supposed to have created the world, everything that is there. At theism, this Creator is supposed to intervene in the further course in a sustaining and steering manner, at deism not (Knauer 1978). That both theism and deism are not tenable on a rational level, i.e. on a justifying and non-contradicting level, results from the following:

If the world is viewed as the space with its temporal, a transcendent Creator must be spaceless. However, since no cause exists at the assumptively existing spaceless from which extension, space could become existing (- compare 1.1. -), it is also impossible to create something spatial from something spaceless. If, on the other hand, the world is viewed as the union of the space with its temporal and the spaceless with the assumptively existing spaceless time, there can be no third entity that would be a transcendent Creator due to the law of excluded middle. Thus not only theism and deism are ruled out as untenable, but any kind of creation theory, also because an immanent Creator can be excluded due to the completeness of all existing entities (- compare 1.2. -). A God with reference to the world - regardless of whether spaceless and spaceless time exist as part of the world or not - can only be in the world or the world itself. Being-in-the-world would mean that God could be even only a part of what is there. In the following it is shown that God is the world and has a consciousness which is in its essence comparable to human consciousness. A certain pantheism is thus justified (Culp 2020).

That God is not only in the world - the world is viewed as the space with its temporal -, but must be the complete world, follows from the fact that by definition no being can exist above God, since God is the highest, greatest being. If God were only in the world and were not the complete world, then the world itself would be a higher, greater being than the said God, which would contradict the definition of God. This is also due to the fact that every spatio-temporal quantity, every quantity out of parts of the space and certain temporal that includes a being with consciousness, has at least as much consciousness as this being since everything is comparable with each other and nothing unsuitable to each other exists in space and temporal (- compare 2.7. -). Also a quantity that includes a being with consciousness and contains spaceless (and spaceless time), has at least as much consciousness as this being since the spaceless (and the spaceless time) only determine this being which consists of parts of the space and possibly temporal, more precisely through unequal-determinations. Thus God is one with the entire world - the world considered as the space with its temporal together with the spaceless (and its spaceless time) - regardless of whether spaceless (and spaceless time) exists or not, and has a consciousness similar to a being that is one with a human being and which has the existence of something spatially extended for itself as a necessary and sufficient criterion for the existence of its consciousness. For God nothing is distant, there is no distance since God is every part of the space. God is all existing temporal comparisons, all conceivable determinations in the sense of 2.3. and thus the entire existing temporal. For God, temporal only exists inwardly, there is no temporal outside of God. God is the being which at the same time and in other respects "is the case" as the nothing (- compare 1.1. -); like the human being, God only exists through comparisons.

Do the ontic laws of thought apply to God? What are God's attributes? Is God self-determined, omniscient and omnipotent? The ontic laws of thought which also apply in the sphere of the spaceless, have their validity for God because God is the world free of contradictions with its inner cause-effect-chains. According to the definition of self-determination from 2.3. God is self-determined, regardless of whether spaceless (and spaceless time) exist or not; God determines its future deterministically completely itself, also because for God a free will can only originally exist at the beginning of a time. To clarify omniscience, consider subchapter 2.5.: God is the world, therefore knows all existing parts of the space, without distance to them, as well as all existing temporal, and because of 1.5. also everything that has existed. God is the will which includes the entire parts of the space that exist existentially the highest, and everything staying previous, which only wants something without contradiction, and is therefore realized as wanted. God thus knows the entire future, but not existentially the highest since for God the staying previous that is required for this, only exists existentially as high as the existentially lowest component of this.

An omnipotence is impossible due to 1.7. and due to the impossibility of a free will in more advanced times; God is bound to the deterministic courses of time, to the deterministic time developments which God is at the same time. God cannot therefore prematurely end started deterministic courses of time in order to prevent future unhappiness which God knows existentially not the highest. Furthermore, an intervention in these deterministic courses of time could only happen via conceivable influences or entanglements between different deterministic courses of time whereby these influences or entanglements would in turn be determined, regardless of whether they make happiness or unhappiness existing. So for an omnipotence, a non-determined intervention is also lacking.

This argumentation also applies to the demon hypothesis, the hypothesis that a demon, a being that wants our unhappiness and wants to deceive us, could exist (Putnam 1991). This demon has the same right to be the case as God and, like God, would be bound to the deterministic time developments and, as described above for God, could not intervene non-determined in these time developments. Since God is the world, a demon who is supposed to be at odds with God would be a part of God and bound to God's determinism, to God's deterministic time development. The demon hypothesis can thus be put aside, also because after 2.1. a deception in what the environment around oneself is, exists only through existentially highest lacks of information for oneself which lets something in the environment around oneself be recognizable differently than it is in itself. Not existentially the highest, everyone has the true knowledge of the environment around itself. Because of the shown non-existence of God's omnipotence, suffering in the world can also be explained, the theodicy problem can be solved: God cannot prevent suffering and it exists because it is part of the existing deterministic time developments.

Here it was thus shown that God is the world, has a consciousness comparable to human beings, cannot have omnipotence due to the determinism that prevails for it, and thus cannot prevent suffering in the world.

3.2. Does consciousness exist endlessly further?

Near-death experiences are probably the most important indication that consciousness could continue to exist after death. They are usually experienced by people in life-threatening situations, such as cardiac arrest (van Lommel 2021). It should be noted, however, that reports of near-death experiences do not prove a consciousness for each individual after death, much less an endless consciousness. It could be that conscious experiences such as near-death experiences simply do not occur (anymore) after the death for certain individuals, or that a conscious being after death simply ends after a certain period of time. Due to such reports, therefore, it is only likely that consciousness continues to exist endlessly after death, e.g. in one of the reported ways, similar to what is likely to happen that every human being will die on earth since multitudes of human beings have already died there and all people have a similar physiognomy, they are one with each other and differ from each other only in certain spatial and temporal comparisons. Since this probability thus offers no certainty about an endless consciousness, a proof of an endless consciousness for each individual is still imperative, which will be demonstrated in the following.

It should be noted that at an out-of-body experience which can occur during a near-death experience, the soul of the individual in question must leave the body so that the individual recognizes their entire 360-degree-environment (van Lommel 2021: 22). Three possible reasons why the soul that has left the body, is almost always not recognizable for an observer, are now given: First, it could be that the soul that has left the body, exists as part of the staying previous environment around the observer and not as part of his current part of the space, which means that it no longer exists existentially the highest for the observer (- cf. example from 1.5. -). Fewer time units would therefore have to exist for the soul that has left the body, than for the observer. Second, it could be that the soul that has left the body, could have the same density, color as its direct environment which is often air, and therefore cannot be recognizably demarcated from it and is therefore not recognizable to an observer. Thirdly, it could be that the observer consciously exists in a different deterministic course of time than the soul that has left the body, whereby there no longer has to be an entanglement between the deterministic courses of time (- cf. 2.7. -).

In 2.7. it was shown that the existence of something spatially extended for an individual is not only necessary, but also sufficient for the existence of its consciousness. So it only has to be shown in order to prove that the consciousness of the deceased continues to exist endlessly after their death, that always a part of the space exists which the deceased is in the changes after his death, and that thus endlessly new changes, new time units become existing for him. Due to the prevailing determinism in the deterministic course of time of the deceased, the changes after the death of the deceased are one with the changes before his death and only differ from each other in certain spatial and temporal comparisons. Since the deceased always continued to exist in the changes before his death after the respective change as a part of the part of the space, the deceased continues to exist after his death as a part of the newly occurring part of the space, also because for the deceased the being-one in the changes after his death exists with himself in the changes before his death and the deceased only differs in certain spatial and temporal comparisons there. This continued existence results from the completeness of the space: Both the demanded newly occuring part of the space and its demanded part which the deceased then is, exist as part of the whole complete space, can be “drawn” from the entire complete space, also because the entire complete space with its inner time stays existent due to its also existing independence from everything assumptively spaceless (- cf. 1.5. and 2.4 -).

One question that arises here, is whether this process can be continued endlessly. Can a case occur that brings this process to a standstill? Such a case can be constructed. For that, the effects of the parts of the occured staying parts of the space on each other should be considered (- cf. 2.3. -). Through these effects, it could lead to a standstill occurring in a deterministic course of time whilst these effects together form the following will: This will (- cf. 2.4. -) includes everything staying previous and the entire part of the space that exists existentially the highest, is composed of the single existing space densities and only wants something without contradiction in such a way that all parts of the part of the space are wanted to stay at their location through these effects with which this will is realized as wanted, so in such a way that no change occurs. For example, at such a will, a part of the existentially highest part of the space can "push" on its neighbor with the same "force" as the latter "pushes" on it whereby the "forces" cancel each other out.

How can the occurrence of such a case be ruled out whereby an endless time would exist for the deceased and even generally for every individual that has spatial extension, which includes all human beings, and thus the proof of the endless consciousness would be completed?

For this we consider the beginning of the existence of an individual (- cf. 1.6. -). There it only exists spatially as a part of the space and time begins with the equal randomness (- cf. 1.7. -). At this, to the next time unit, among other things, it also becomes another part of the space via determinations (which determine which parts of the other part of the space that completes the change, are the parts of the part of the space from before the change then after the change) (- cf. 2.3. -). This becoming proceeds as follows: Each space density of the part of the space from before the change becomes minimally denser - or minimally less dense if it should already be a relatively dense one - or minimally changes its form without effects of the space densities on each other and without effects of others deterministic courses of time on the considered one. Why? Since this is a conceivable case that has the same right to exist as the other conceivable cases and thus exists. Such a minimal change in density or form also occurs as the second time unit without effects of the space densities on each other and without effects of other deterministic courses of time on the considered one. For example, a space density A becomes the minimally denser space density A´ and this space density A´ then becomes the minimally denser to A´ space density A´´. This creates for each space density a sufficient causal chain which is set as a sufficient cause for the becoming of another space density after the second time unit of the individual. Due to the existence of the whole complete space, this minimal change of a certain space density can be continued endlessly and indeed for any such space density without effects of the single space densities on each other and without effects of other deterministic courses of time on the considered one. Thus, in this case, an endless time and an endless consciousness exists because if the heights of existence above that described here should come to a standstill and should no longer become more existing, that described here would change from non-conscious to conscious over time, would become the conscious. Thus the proof is completed:

Consciousness is endless.

3.3. Final notes

Final notes now follow that run through cases with certain assumptions for which the proof of the endless consciousness would continue to be valid. The assumptions are those that have already been explicitly or implicitly refuted in the previous text.

The proof of the endless time with the consequence of the endless consciousness also applies if it is assumed that (still) other substances than the empty space in its various forms would exist because according to 1.2. these would have to be complete, i.e. they would have to exist in every conceivable form and with minimal differences to each other in their substance at every location, so that endless deterministic courses of time would also exist there. An equal randomness which is used in the proof above, would then also always exist for these (still) other substances; and the necessary and sufficient characteristic of consciousness, the existence of something spatially extended for one (- cf. 2.7. -) would continue to exist as necessary and sufficient, also because of the note from 1.2. and because all assumptively existing (still) other substances would be comparable to each other. If it is assumed that other accidents than the form also exist, these would not disturb an endless deterministic course of time in the proof above since each part of the whole complete space would continue to exist with minimal differences to another part because of the completeness of the accidents and the demanded endless deterministic courses of time would continue to exist.

If, assumptively, further dimensions than the three recognizable in the form of height, width and depth should exist, each individual would exist, among other things, in a three-dimensional subset of something multidimensional whereby the additional dimensions would have no influence - not even via entanglements - on the three-dimensional subset and so the proof of the endless time for the three-dimensional subset would still apply. This would be the case since each individual would also initially exist in the conceivable and thus existing case in which the additional dimensions would have no influence on it, even if more than the three dimensions would have initially existed for it and in these further dimensions the time would have come to a standstill.

In the case that, assumptively, no first time unit would exist in one's own existence, the proof of the endless time with the consequence of the endless consciousness would change as follows: The part of the space would be considered which would be assumptively the last in time of the determinations that would have been determined, which parts of the space the individual in question would have been respectively after the respective change (- cf. 2.3. -). This temporally last part of the space - called A - would have parts, even if it would only consist of one space density because this would be divisible into several parts which would be respectively individuals with a distance and a thereby resulting appearing being-darker, among other things, from non-adjacent parts of the part of the space A to them (- cf. 2.1. -). For each of these parts an equal randomness would begin, as well as an endless temporal sequence of minimal changes in density (- cf. 3.2. -). Thus, for the individual in question, the temporally last part of the space A would not be the temporally last after all; it would be followed by endless more changes and thus by parts of the space which would be the individual in question. There, these parts of the space would each be the sum of the parts from the minimal changes in density. These endless more changes would also exist without the influence of assumptively existing additional dimensions (- see previous paragraph -) since this would be a conceivable and therefore existing case.

Finally, the author also wants to note that in the case of a lack of knowledge for him regarding the justification of the objection from 1.1., that no cause would exist at the assumptively existing spaceless, out of which the extension, space could become existing, the provided knowledge of him in this text would change only slightly. Since, if assumptively out of spaceless through the cause, through the will "unequal spaceless wanted" extension, space would become existing and possibly also impenetrable substances, substances behind which something would never be recognizable for a preceding observer, the epistemology from 2.1. would only expand with regard to these impenetrable substances insignificantly and with regard to 3.1. the spaceless would be a deistic-pantheistic God who would expand himself into being the union of space with its temporal and spaceless with the assumptively existing spaceless time. All other findings from the remaining subchapters would continue to apply, even for impenetrable substances that might exist.

In this last chapter God's pantheistic nature was presented; shown that he possesses no omnipotence, to then complete the proof of the endlessness of every existing consciousness by means of the existing complete space.

4. Conclusion

The aim of the text, the proof of the endlessness of consciousness, could be achieved through a precise analysis of the existing extension of the being and its existing changes. From these two existences, inferences were ultimately only made in an analytical way without the use of axioms with which the findings of the two Gödel´s incompleteness theorems, in particular of the second incompleteness theorem, that every sufficiently mighty consistent formal system cannot prove its own consistency (Hofstaedter 1995), do not touch the proof of the endless consciousness.

From the knowledge that consciousness is endless, new research topics inevitably arise: Does only good exist for oneself after death, does everyone become then happier and happier? If so, why? Can it be proven that a recognition of individuals known to one from earthly life, exists after death? Can communication between the living on earth and the deceased be established with the help of new technologies? These technologies should go beyond the possibilities of existing questionable ones, such as the EVP- (Electronic Voice Phenomena) technology (Jürgenson 1989). Spirit mediums, people who claim to be able to receive information from the deceased, could contribute to the development, by checking allegedly received information from the deceased for correctness with a new type of communication device. All of this is still a long way off, but so was wireless telecommunications a century ago. The basic requirement for this, the endless consciousness was hereby given.

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